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Abstract
This thesis presents both empirical and theoretical studies on horseracing betting
markets. The first two chapters mainly deal with the insider trading problem in
the betting markets based on the Shin model (1993) and its extension (Jullien and
Salanié (1994)) by employing a novel data set from Yorkshire racecourses during the
2013-2014 racing season. Apart from measuring the incidence of insider trading, we
empirically test market efficiency. Our result demonstrates that the degree of insider
trading based on the original Shin measure is slightly lower than the calculation
based on its extension. We also find no evidence to confirm that the market is
strongly efficient. The next chapter studies price-determining factors that affect the
starting prices in the racing markets by utilising a unique cross-sectional and time
series data set. We find strong evidence to suggest that the winning potential, the
age of the horse, the weight the horse carries and the distance of the race are very
significant factors in explaining the starting prices. Our findings also confirm that
the condition of the turf, the size of the racecourse and the classification of the race
have influences on the price. In the last chapter, we propose a theoretical model of
how betting odds are adjusted by bookmakers in betting markets. We introduce the
optimal stopping techniques into the betting literature for the first time through
a two-horse simple benchmark model with both informed and uninformed noise
punters. Our main finding shows that increased fraction of informed traders will
initially lift the loss per trade to the bookmaker, but after reaching a certain point
the loss declines. We also find out that as the fraction of noise traders goes up, the
loss is incurred to learn, but the learning process is less informative and the costs
are the same, so the decision of changing the prices for each horse is taken sooner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“It were not best that we should all think alike;
it is difference of opinion that makes horse-races.”
Mark Twain,
Pudd’nhead Wilson’s Calendar, 1894.
1.1 History of British Horse Racing
Sports betting is an ancient human activity prevailed in the United Kingdom for
hundreds of years, which now contributes multi-billion pounds to the economy
and has become a large and thriving industry. Horse racing is the second biggest
spectator sport after football with a long history dating back to the Roman era.
Racing has been part of Britain’s national heritage for ages and still serves as an
important everyday pastime.
It was the Roman soldiers who brought the first race to take place in Yorkshire,
Britain around 200 AD. Before that racing was only popular in Egypt, Syria and
Ancient Greece. By the 9th/10th century horse racing had become quite popular in
the UK. During the reign of Henry VIII in the 16th century, he passed breeding laws
as to the breeding of horses and imported a large number of stallions and mares.
That is when the formal race gathering began to be instigated and a trophy started
to be presented to the winner of a race. Kiplingcotes Derby is widely known as the
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world’s oldest horse race in England since 1519. Newmarket, discovered by James
I in 1605, has been generally considered the birthplace of horse race since then.
Race meetings began to spring up elsewhere in the country and jockey weights
were rigorously enforced in the 17th century. Gatherley, Yorkshire, Croydon and
Theobalds on Enfield Chase were the major places for races to run for silver bells.
Hundred years later, in the early 18th century Queen Anne set eyes on Ascot where
the opening race nowadays at Royal Ascot is still called the Queen Anne Stakes to
commemorate her. Between these two periods, Oliver Cromwell in 1654 banned all
horse racing, along with other gambling activity that the public enjoyed. However,
Charles II restored racing as soon as he claimed the throne. He also introduced the
Newmarket Town Plate and wrote the rules himself1.
“Articles ordered by His Majestie to be observed by all persons that
put in horses to ride for the Plate, the new round heat at Newmarket
set out on the first day of October, 1664, in the 16th year of our
Sovereign Lord King Charles II, which Plate is to be rid for yearly,
the second Thursday in October for ever.”
King Charles II,
Rules of the Newmarket Town Plate.
In 1740, the Parliament tried to restrain and prevent the excessive increase in
horse racing by introducing an act, but it did not go well. So in 1750, the Jockey Club
was founded to implement the rules of racing. In 1993, the British Horseracing Board
(BHB) became responsible for race planning, training, financing and marketing,
which removed the governance role of the Jockey Club, but it can still regulate the
sport. In 2006, the Horseracing Regulatory Authority (HRA) was formed to carry
out the regulatory process. In July 2007, after the merger of the HRA and the BHB,
the British Horseracing Authority was formed to “provide the most compelling and
attractive racing in the world; be seen as the world leader in race-day regulation;
ensure the highest standards for the sport and participants, on and away from the
1The history of Great British racing. Accessible via: http://www.greatbritishracing.com/about-
great-british-racing/the-history-of-great-british-racing.
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racecourse; promote the best for the racehorse; and represent and promote the
sport and the industry”2.
Horse racing is still considered as the Sport of Kings. The current Queen of
England Elizabeth II has bred and owned horses to compete at Royal Ascot and some
classic races. However, as the internet can be easily accessed, it is more accessible
to the public nowadays. It has become a pastime activity to the masses - from rich
to poor, lord to civilian, and professional to laymen - through bookmakers in the
ring, betting shops in the street, newspapers, televisions and betting websites.
1.2 Motivation
Economic impact measures the benefit of an event to the economy. In other words,
consumers are willing to spend money now rather than keep it, which based on
the theory that a pound flows into the market. The impact of sports economics not
only incurs large sums of cash to the gambling market but also generates a positive
economic outcome for the local economy in terms of facilities, tax incomes, jobs
and infrastructure. In the literature, the seminal work of Simon Rottenberg (1956),
which studied the restrictions on baseball players in the labour market, laid the
foundation of sports economics. Over the last 30 years, the literature has thrilled
and flourished, especially in the 1990s. The earlier research has a strong preference
on the major National American leagues. Most researchers focus on the data, which
are collected from the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and the Major League Baseball (MLB) and so on. These markets
provide a natural laboratory for economists3. Horse racing plays an important role
in the British history. Even to this day, it is still the second largest spectator sports
after football in the United Kingdom. The revenues generated from the racing are a
significant component of the economy.
2British Horseracing Authority. Accessible via: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British _ Horserac-
ing _ Authority.
3Cooke. A. Sports Economics. Accessible via: http://www.studyingeconomics.ac.uk/module-
options/sports-economics/.
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According to the latest report on the economic impact of British racing by De-
loitte commissioned by the British Horseracing Authority (BHA) in 20134, horserac-
ing was worth about £1.1 billion to the UK economy - £3.45 billion if all direct
and indirect expenditure of racing are included and contributed more than £275
million to the government in tax and over £1.4 billion in total in the last five years.
There were 5.6 million attendance at 1369 fixtures over 60 racecourses and 17500
individual runners in 2012. As “[r]acing’s economic impact is estimated based on
the direct expenditure of its participants and the associated expenditure of racing
consumers”, it is obvious that horseracing markets alone play an important role in
the British economy.
A majority literature on the horse racing betting markets focuses on market
efficiency (see Vaughan Williams (2005) for a survey. Parimutuel: Ali (1977), Snyder
(1978), Figlewski (1979), Hausch et al. (1981), Asch et al. (1984, 1986); Fixed odds:
Dowie (1976), Crafts (1985), Cain et al. (1990), Gabriel and Marsden (1990)), famous
favourite - longshot bias (FL bias; see Griffith (1949), McGlothlin (1956), Fabricand
(1965), Ali (1977), Hausch, Ziemba, and Rubinstein (1981), Asch, Malkiel, and Quandt
(1982), Henery (1985), Ziemba and Hausch (1984), Brown, D’Amato and Gertner
(1994), and Shing and Koch (2008)) and insider trading (Shin (1991, 1992, 1993),
Jullien and Salanié (1994), Fingleton and Waldron (1999)). As a betting market
resembles a financial market in many ways, we utilise this market to study several
topics related to insider trading problems, market efficiency theory, pricing factors
and odds-setting procedure.
As mentioned before, a betting market is a simple example of a financial market,
for instance, a large number of investors (bettors), extensive market information
and ease of entry. It also offers a chance to study decision-making under uncertainty
and risk. This market also raises the informational issues. The major difference
is that there is a well-defined termination point at which the value of the asset is
fixed at the end of the betting period. The added advantage is that we are no longer
4Economic Impact of British Racing 2013. Accessible via:
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EconomicImpactStudy2013.pdf.
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bounded by future cash flow and net present value. Based on the above narrative,
we pay our attention to this particular market.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis contributes to the horse racing betting literature by utilising both em-
pirical and theoretical methods to analyse the following problems: insider trading,
market efficiency, determinants of the betting odds and odds-setting mechanism.
In Chapter 2 we examine the insider trading problem in the Yorkshire horse
racing betting markets. We employ a large new data set, collecting from Yorkshire
racecourses during the 2013 racing season, to estimate the incidence of insider
trading. Two methods are included. Based upon the Shin (1993) measure, our
results suggest that the incidence of insider trading in Yorkshire in 2013 is around
1.7 percent and there is a strong positive correlation between the overall margin
implicit in bookmakers’ odds and the number of runners in a race. Based on the
extended Shin measure, the weighted average degree of insider activity at starting
prices is around 2.103 percent, which is slightly higher than that measured by the
original method, and at opening prices, it is around 1.64 percent. In Chapter 3,
we recollect the data from 9 Yorkshire racecourses during the 2014 racing season.
We perform some tests to consolidate our results in the previous chapter. First of
all, we apply the extension of the Shin measure to obtain the average degree of
insider trading at starting and opening prices respectively. The degree is around
2.07 percent at starting prices and 1.65 percent at opening prices. They are pretty
much the same when we use the 2013 data. Secondly, we find supportive evidence
to confirm that insiders tend to place a bet at the early stage, which is consistent
with the Crafts’ (1985) hypothesis. Thirdly, the average rates of return at both
starting and opening prices are significantly affected by the incidence of insider
trading. Last but not least, we show that a gambler is doomed to lose even if he
constantly bets on the favourite horse, and the average loss is around 0.3314 per
stake.
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Chapter 4 analyses the determinants that have influences on the starting prices
of horses by utilising a unique cross-sectional and time series data set. A fixed-
effects (within) regression model is estimated on a database of 100 horses and
the corresponding results have partially identified the factors that can be used to
explain the price setting mechanism. There is a plethora of empirical evidence
to suggest that the winning potential, the age of the horse, the weight the horse
carries and the distance of the race are very significant factors in determining the
price of the horse. Our findings confirm that the condition of the turf, the size of
the racecourse and the classification of the race affect the price as well. All these
factors are quite persistent based on the estimation results.
In Chapter 5, we present a theoretical model of how betting odds are adjusted
by bookmakers in betting markets. We introduce the optimal stopping techniques
into the betting literature for the first time through a tractable two-horse setting
with both informed and uninformed noise punters. A risk-neutral bookmaker who
selects a stopping time decides when to adjust the betting odds for each horse
in a race when the cumulative sales of tickets on horse A, net of the cumulative
sales of tickets on horse B are modelled by an arithmetic Brownian motion. A
costly learning process discloses what information the informed trader possesses.
With sequential hypothesis testing, the bookmaker can declare that one of the
two hypotheses is true with reasonable certainty and therefore changes the odds
correspondingly. Our main finding shows that the increased fraction of informed
traders will initially lift the loss per trade to the bookmaker, but after reaching a
certain point the loss declines. One explanation is that the more informed traders,
there is more information the bookmaker can get per time period, which leads to a
decision being taken sooner. So the decreased loss should be expected, which is
consistent with our assumption as well as our intuition about this market. We also
find out that as the fraction of noise traders goes up, the loss is incurred to learn,
but the learning process is less informative and costs are the same, so the decision
of changing the prices for each horse is taken sooner.
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1.4 Appendix: Some Mathematical Preliminaries
Weierstrass Approximation Theorem
Theorem 1.4.1. (See Estep (2002)) Assume that f is continuous on a closed bounded
interval I. Given any ϵ > 0, there is a polynomial Pn with sufficiently high degree n
such that
| f (x)− Pn(x) |< ϵ for a ≤ x ≤ b.
The following section is mainly for Chapter 5.
Probability Spaces and Stochastic Processes
In this subsection we briefly review some basic concepts from general probability
theory and the definition of stochastic processes.
Definition 1.4.2. (See Øksendal (2005)) If Ω is a given set, then a σ-algebra F on
Ω is a family F of subsets of Ω with the following properties:
(i) ∅ ∈ F
(ii) F ∈ F ⇒ FC ∈ F , where FC =Ω \ F is the complement of F in Ω
(iii) A1,A2, · · · ∈ F ⇒ A := ∪∞i=1Ai ∈ F
The pair (Ω,F ) is called a measurable space. A probability measure P on a
measurable space (Ω,F ) is a function P: F → [0,1] such that
(a) P(∅) = 0, P(Ω) = 1
(b) if A1,A2, · · · ∈ F and {Ai}∞i=1 is disjoint (i.e. Ai ∩ Aj =∅ if i ̸= j) then
P (∪∞i=1Ai) =
∞
∑
i=1
P(Ai).
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The triple (Ω,F ,P) is called a probability space. It is called a complete probability
space if F contains all subsets G of Ω with P-outer measure zero, i.e. with
P∗(G) := inf{P(F);F ∈ F ,G ⊂ F} = 0.
The subsets F of Ω which belong to F are called F -measurable sets. In a
probability context theses sets are called events and we use the interpretation
P(F)=“the probability that the event F occurs”.
In particular, if P(F) = 1 we say that “F occurs with probability 1”, or “almost
surely (a.s.)”.
Given any family U of subsets ofΩ there is a smallest σ-algebraHU containing
U , namely
HU=⋂{H; H σ− algebra o f Ω, U ⊂ H}
Thus, a collection U of all open subsets of a topological space Ω, then B =HU
is called the Borel σ− algebra on Ω and the elements B ∈ B are called Borel sets.
B contains all open sets, all closed sets, all countable unions of closed sets, all
countable intersections of such countable unions etc.
Definition 1.4.3 (Borel function). (See Capinski and Kopp (2004)) For any interval
I ∈R, if all the sets
f−1(I) ∈ B
we say that f is a Borel function.
Suppose that P and Q are two probability measures on (Ω,F ). Then we define
the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4.4 (Radon-Nikodym Theorem). Suppose Q is absolutely continuous
with respect to P (i.e. P∼Q⇐⇒ [∀A ∈ F ,P(A) = 0⇐⇒ Q(A) = 0]). Then there
exists a random variable f such that
Q(F) =
∫
F
f dP,∀F ∈ F
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The function f is called the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Q with respect to P. This
can be written as
f (ω) =
dQ
dP
(ω)
The Randon-Nikodym Theorem shows how to change from one probability
measure to another.
Definition 1.4.5 (Conditional Expectations). (See Capinski and Kopp (2004)) For an
integrable random variable ξ on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and an event B ∈ B
such that P(B) ̸= 0 the conditional expectations of ξ given B is defined by
E (ξ | B) = 1
P(B)
∫
B
ξdP.
Definition 1.4.6. (See Øksendal (2005)) A stochastic process is a parametrized col-
lection of random variables
{Xt}t∈T
defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and assuming values in Rn.
The following subsections are based on Thijssen (2013).
Poisson Process
Poisson process is a simple example of stochastic process. Let (T0,T1, · · · ) be a
strictly increasing sequence of random variables with T0 = 0. Define the indicator
function
It≥Tn =
1 if t ≥ Tn(ω)0 if t < Tn(ω)
The Tn-s describe the times at which the events happen.
Definition 1.4.7. The counting process associated with the sequence (T0,T1, · · · ) is
the process (Nt)t≥0 defined by Nt = ∑n≥0 It≥Tn .
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Note that (Nt)t≥0 takes values in {0,1,2, · · · }. Let T := supn Tn. Thus (Nt)t≥0
is a counting process without explosions if T = ∞, P-a.s. In such cases we never
encounter sample paths with infinitely many defaults.
Definition 1.4.8. A counting process without explosions is a Poisson process if
(i) Nt − Ns is independent of Ns, for all s < t;
(ii) for any s < t and u < v, with t− s = v− u it holds that Nt − Ns have the
same distribution.
The following can now be shown.
Theorem 1.4.9. Let (Nt)t≥0 be a Poisson process. Then there exists a λ ≥ 0 such
that Nt ∼ Poiss(λt) for all t ≥ 0.
This theorem explains why we often say the (Nt)t≥0 is a Poisson process “with
parameter λ”. In differential form we can write
dNt =
1 w.p. λdt0 w.p. 1− λdt
It can also be shown that the inter-arrival times between jumps is exponentially
distributed with parameter 1/λ.
Binomial Tree
Suppose a coin is flipped infinitely many times, and if Heads (H) shows up we win
u, and losing d if Tails (T) comes up. Assume that all coin flips are independent
and that the probability of heads is 0< p < 1. Let nH denote the number of Heads
in n flips, so the probability of observing nH Heads in n coin flips is
p(nH) = pnH(1− p)n−nH
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Let X1,X2, · · · be a sequence of random variables, which indicate your winning
for each flip
Xi =
u if Heads−d if Tails
Total gains after the n-th coin flip are equal to Sn :=
n
∑
i=1
Xi. The sequence
S0,S1,S2, · · · describe a stochastic process, where S0 is the initial wealth. The
evolution of Sn can be depicted in a tree diagram as below.
S0 + 2u
S0 + u
S0 S0 + u− d
S0 − d
S0 − 2d
P
(1− p)
P2
(1− p)p
(1− p
)p
(1− p) 2
Theorem 1.4.10 (Central Limit Theorem). Let X1,X2, · · · be a sequence of indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with mean µ and variance
σ2. Let X¯n := 1n
n
∑
i=1
Xi. Then
√
n X¯n−µσ
d−→N (0,1), as n→∞.
Arithmetic Brownian Motion (ABM)
Definition 1.4.11 (Brownian motion). A process (Bt)t≥0 taking values in R is a
Brownian motion if
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(i) Bt − Bs is independent of Bs, for all 0≤ s < t;
(ii) Bt − Bs ∼N (0, t− s), for all 0≤ s < t.
An arithmetic Brownian motion can be derived as the continuous time limit
of a binomial tree with S0 = y, p = 1/2, u = µdt+ σ
√
dt and d = µdt− σ√dt,
thus we define the ABM as
dSt = µdt+ σdBt
A few examples of the ABM are depicted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Sample Paths of an Arithmetic Brownian Motion
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Stopping Time
A stopping time is a random variable τ to which the question “has the event {τ ≤ t}
occurred?” can be answered at any time t ≥ 0. So for each y ∈ E and each t ≥ 0,
it holds that Py(τ ≤ t) ∈ {0,1}. Most stopping times depend on the underlying
stochastic process (St)t≥0. For example, if the firm decides to invest as soon as
some pre-determined threshold (or “trigger”) S∗ is reached, then the (random) time
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at which investment takes place is the first hitting time
τy(S∗) = inf{t ≥ 0 | St ≥ S∗,S0 = y} .
Ito’s Lemma
In this subsection we first define the following stochastic process,
Yt = y+
∫ t
0
µ(s,Ys)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Ys)dBs (1.1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Brownian motion and Y0 = y. Processes as in (1.1) are called Ito
Diffusions. In differential notation we obtain
dYt = µ(t,Yt)dt+ σ(t,Yt)dBt (1.2)
Equation (1.2) is called a stochastic differential equation(SDE), the function µ(·)
is called the trend and σ(·) is called the volatility. If the trend and volatility do not
depend on t, we call the diffusion time homogeneous. In this thesis we just work
with time homogeneous diffusion only.
Theorem 1.4.12 (Ito’s Lemma). Let (Yt)t≥0 follows an Ito diffusion (1.1) and let
g(t,Yt) be a twice continuously differentiable function. Then
dX =
∂g(·)
∂t
dt+
∂g(·)
∂Y
dY+
1
2
∂2g(·)
∂Y2
dY2
=
[
∂g(·)
∂t
+
∂g(·)
∂Y
µ(·) + 1
2
∂2g(·)
∂Y2
σ(·)2
]
dt+
∂g(·)
∂Y
σ(·)dBt
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Chapter 2
An Examination of Insider Trading
in Yorkshire Horseracing Betting
Markets
2.1 Introduction
The pioneering work of Bagehot (1971) shows his great interest in the field of the
bid-ask spread in financial markets. Copeland and Galai (1983) then formalise the
problem and shed lights on how a market maker tries to optimise the bid-ask spread
by maximising the difference between the gain from liquidity traders and the loss
to traders with superior information. Subsequent research followed the path to
analyse the optimal bid-ask spread. In a seminal paper, Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
have explored the idea that the way the specialists setting the bid-ask spread can
be an informational phenomenon by assuming that they are risk-neutral and make
zero profits. They also find that transaction prices can reflect insider information.
Most recently, researchers have studied both US and UK betting markets regard-
ing the insider trading problem. Furthermore, this market can also be used to test
market efficiency theory and herding behaviour and so on. Applying the theory of
Glosten and Milgrom, Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) examines insider activity in betting
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markets in the United Kingdom. He shows that the spread is increasing with the
incidence of insider trading and this insider problem might partially explain market
distortion. In the Shin’s paper, he proposes an index to measure the incidence of
insider trading in the British horse racing betting markets. His setting fits into
the British horse racing system well, as in the UK betting odds are determined by
bookmakers, in contrast to the system in North America where odds are derived
from the parimutuel method.
The problem of insider trading may disturb financial markets in many ways.
Bookmakers at racecourses in horse-racing betting markets face the same problem.
There is a bunch of punters, some of whom may have inside information on which
horse will win in a race, and on the contrary, some outsiders whose preferences are
indifferent across all horses. The betting market shares many similarities with the
financial market. In particular, in both types of markets, a large number of investors
(punters) can easily access to readily cheaply public information before they buy
state-contingent claims (betting tickets). In addition, the return on an investment (a
bet) is uncertain because the winning horse is unknown at the moment. Therefore
anyone who has inside information will earn extra profits. A bookmaker, on the
other hand, is an intermediary just like the market maker in financial markets, who
is responsible for setting the odds or the prices of tickets in the United Kingdom.
Due to the above characteristics, we aim to examine, in samples of 997 horse
races, the degree of insider trading based on the original Shin measure (1993) and
its extension by Jullien and Salanié (1994). The other purpose of the paper is to
test the existence of strong form efficiency. The data set that we utilise is collected
from nine racecourses in Yorkshire during the 2013 racing season. Our findings
consolidate the result of the Shin model, and we conclude that the incidence of
insider trading is around 1.7%. Based on the extension of the Shin measure, the
degree of insider trading at Starting Prices is around 2.103%, while at Opening
Prices 1.64%. We also demonstrate that the market is not strongly efficient.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The related literature is summarised
in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 outlines the betting system in the United Kingdom. In
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Section 2.4, we analyse data on starting prices collected during the 2013 racing
season in Yorkshire, United Kingdom and present the empirical results based on
the Shin measure. Section 2.5 contains the empirical results based on the extension
of the Shin measure. Section 2.6 delivers the concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on the horse racing betting markets can be divided into two parts.
The first part studies the incidence of insider trading and the second part focuses
on testing market efficiency.
The incidence of insider trading in the betting market is measured by Shin
(1991, 1992, 1993) who portrays a situation where bookmakers purposely raise
risk premium to insure themselves against the presence of a certain percentage of
informed traders. His model exhibits favourite-longshot bias in general, whereby the
prices against favourites are relatively high than those against longshots. The other
basic feature of the Shin model is that there is a strong positive correlation between
the overall margin implicit in bookmakers’ odds and the number of runners in a race
(Shin (1993) and Fingleton and Waldron (1999)). Jullien and Salanié (1994) firstly
revise the Shin’s iterative procedure on linearised versions of the equations. They
show that a standard nonlinear estimation procedure can be obtained by employing
the quadratic formula. Fingleton and Waldron (1999) relax the assumptions in the
Shin measure and develop a more general model of how the odds are determined
by bookmakers given that the levels of insider trading vary from race to race on
the part of punters. This model incorporates the bookmakers’ attitudes towards
risk and the possibility of anti-competition among them as well. It turns out that
bookmakers are extremely risk-averse in the Irish market during the 1993 race
season and a combination of monopoly rents and operating costs are taken up
4 percent of turnover and between 3.1 and 3.7 percent of all bets is placed by
bettors with inside information. Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) examines
the favourite-longshot bias by using a large new data set, which is collected from
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British racetracks. Their empirical tests identify this bias and characterise it as a
rational response to bookmakers who face punters with the superior information.
This is an adverse selection problem in the betting markets1. Law and Peel (2002)
attempt to capture herding activity in the horse-race betting market and distinguish
the shortening odds over the betting auction period caused by insider trading. Their
conclusions suggest that a large plunge from opening to starting prices accompanied
by a fall in the Shin measure would be a strong signal of herd behaviour.
Research on market efficiency theory begins with Fama in the early 1960s. A
market is considered to be efficient if two conditions are satisfied: (1) prices fully
reflect historical prices and public announcements and (2) no special groups or indi-
viduals have monopolistic access to some relevant information (inside information)
and can achieve higher than normal profits. However, market efficiency per se is
not testable and must proceed on the models of market equilibrium which can be
described in terms of expected returns in the theoretical and empirical work. It has
become conventional wisdom that the efficient market can be tested by utilising
three subsets of information - weak form, semi-strong form and strong form. Dowie
(1976) uses the term “equity” in place of “strong form efficiency” to test the betting
market on horse races in Britain. His results include that there is no evidence of
the existence of superior inside information holding by a small subset of investors.
He is confident that the hypothesis of “strongly inefficient” betting markets is in
doubt but supporting the belief that the market is “weakly efficient”, which is more
reasonable and acceptable. A final point in the Dowie’s paper shows that even if
the “outsider” obtains as good information as the “insider”, it does not mean he can
exploit it effectively2. Crafts (1985) suggests that the way Dowie tests the “strong
inefficient” market is not appropriate. To argue that, Crafts redesigns a test by
using the same data source as in Dowie’s and gives evidence to prove that there
exist profitable opportunities for insider trading3. Snyder (1978) demonstrates how
1Vaughan Williams, L. and Paton, D. (1997). Why is There a Favourite-Longshot Bias in Britain
Racetrack Betting Markets. The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No. 440, 150-158.
2Dowie, J. (1976). On the Efficiency and Equity of Betting Markets. Economica, Vol. 43, No. 170,
139-150.
3Crafts, N. F. R. (1985). Some Evidence of Insider Knowledge in Horse Race Betting in Britain.
Economica, Vol. 52, No. 207, 295-304.
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these three forms can be applied to horse racing, especially when the odds are
determined by the parimutuel system. He shows through several weak and strong
tests that horse race betting exhibits stable biases of the subjective and empirical
probabilities of winning for both general public bettors and experts and we cannot
expect an above average rate of return. Moreover, a great bias is reflected among
the experts rather than the betting public. Semi-strong tests also shed light on the
absence of an efficient market4. Gabriel and Marsden (1990, 1991) compare the
returns to the bookie’s starting prices and to the parimutuel tote bets, based on the
data from the 1978 horse race season in Britain. Their analysis indicates that on
average the Tote returns to the winning bets are persistently higher than the odds
set by bookmakers given that the risk and the payoffs are widely available under
both systems. This implies that the British horse-race betting market fails to satisfy
the conditions of semi-strong and strong efficiency5.
2.3 The Betting System in Britain
In order to proceed the following analysis, a brief guide to the horse-racing betting
system in Britain is presented here. A typical British punter can wager the money
through two different betting mediums: the totalisator (or the “tote”) and fixed odds
betting. The former one is similar to the parimutuel method in North America.
The payoff to a tote bet is based on the weight of money on each horse relative
to the total bet in the pool. If a horse wins, “the winning pool is proportioned to
those wagering on the winning horse after the takeout (taxes, track cut, owners’
and trainers’ cut) is removed” (Gabriel and Marsden (1990)). Another way is to
place bets with bookmakers at the fixed odds. The odds-setting procedure is quite
similar to pricing risky assets. Bets with a bookie can be accepted at specific but
changing odds in a race. That is, it can be placed either at offered at the time of
the bet or at the starting prices (SP). Bets that made subsequently will not affect
4Snyder, W. (1978). Horse Racing: Testing the Efficient Markets Model. The Journal of Finance,
Vol. 33, No. 4, 1109-1118.
5Gabriel, P. E. and Marsden, J. R. (1990). An Examination of Market Efficiency in British
Racetrack Betting. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 4, 874-885.
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the return to any individual bet, but the odds per se will plunge as the number
of bettors is increasing. The starting prices are defined as the odds at which a
“sizable” bet could have been made on the course just before the race starts (Dowie
(1976)). In the on-course market, as described by Gabriel and Marsden (1990), the
starting prices are measured as “the average of a set of the largest bookmakers at the
racetrack just before the off”. The on-course prices are reported to the off-course
market, and in turn, the off-course prices are reflected as information is relayed to
the on-course market. Therefore the actual starting price is determined by both
off- and on-course behaviour. Forecast odds is conducted by leading sports news
agencies (for example, The Sporting Life) and utilised by the off-course market. In
this chapter, the fractional forms of odds will be converted to the implicit winning
probability. A simple example of SP of two to one (2/1) corresponds to a “percentage”
of 1/(1+2)=1/3, which gives unit stakes required to yield a payout of 1 if the horse
wins in the race. The shorter the odds, the higher the winning probability.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Data Sources
The data set in this paper contains 997 races in Yorkshire in the 2013 horse race
season, of which 11 races would be ruled out due to the fact that the sum of prices
is actually less than one (see Table 2.1). Apparently, this is an anomaly in the
pricing system because any price less than one would give a punter a chance to
obtain risk-free profits. Note also that 97.693 percent of races falls in the range of
1.0 to 1.3 and the distribution is heavily skewed to the left as described in Figure
2.2. Data on the on-course starting prices (SP) for each race are collected from the
website The Sporting Life6 and include all horses (except non-runners) from nine
racecourses in Yorkshire on standard race days. These nine racecourses are located
in Beverley, Catterick, Doncaster, Pontefract, Redcar, Ripon, Thirsk, Wetherby and
York respectively.
6Accessible via: http://www.sportinglife.com/racing.
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Racing in Yorkshire has a long history. Yorkshire racing is a micro- miniature
of British horseracing not only because it boasts more top racetracks than any
other region of the UK, but also because this area contains a number of successful
stables and the Northern Racing College. Nine racecourses host 180 days of racing
throughout the year, from flat to jump races, from national championship races to
most relaxed informality races for family and friends. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
Beverley was a main horse training centre. It held flat races between 25th April
and 24th September in 2013. Catterick Racecourse is one of the busiest racecourses
in North Yorkshire and one of the homes of the Northern racing scene. It holds
meetings all year round. Doncaster racecourse is one of the busiest racecourses in
the UK holding the National Hunt and Flat races almost every month. Racecourse
in Pontefract is also steeped in history with the first meeting in 1801. Our data
contain races from 21st May to 21st October 2013. Redcar and Ripon racecourses
are not just famous for flat racing, it is also the perfect venue for parties and friends
and family gatherings. Thirsk Racecourse is benefited from its location and is
renowned for being one of the prettiest racecourses in the country. Wetherby is
one of the Country’s leading jumping tracks, and it holds flat racing either. York
Racecourse holds flat races from May until October each year, offering a world-
class horseracing experience. Ebor Festival is the most famous race at York and
the richest flat handicap in Europe, which has also been ranked as the best race
in the world by the International Federation of Horseracing Authorities in 2014.
All in all, Yorkshire is synonymous with the very best in British horseracing7. As
we see from Figure 2.1, most racecourses adjacent to the A1/M1, which provide
convenience for racegoers.
As shown by Table 2.1, there are 11 anomalies that need to be deleted as the
sum of starting prices is less than 1. So there are 986 races left and in total 9678
runners. The actual race runs between 2 and 23 horses as depicted in Figure 2.3.
The frequency distribution is summarised in terms of the number of runners (n) in
Figure 2.3. Our regression equation demonstrates a correlation between the sum of
7Accessible via: http://goracing.co.uk/.
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Figure 2.1 Map of Yorkshire with Racecourses
Source: Google Map
prices and the number of runners, along with the distribution of the sum of prices,
we are confident that this correlation is positive and can be identified.
Table 2.1 Distribution of Prices
Sum of prices Frequency
< 1.0 11
1.0∼ 1.1 94
1.1∼ 1.2 676
1.2∼ 1.3 204
1.3∼ 1.4 11
1.4∼ 1.5 0
1.5∼ 1.6 0
> 1.6 1
Note: the first row shows that the sum of the starting prices is less than 1 in 11 races, which offers
the punters an arbitrage opportunity. This is clearly an anomaly in the pricing system. We delete
these anomalies from the sample set. Normally the sum of prices is larger than 1 and the excess
part is the bookmaker’s margin.
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of Sum of Prices
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-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Number of Runners
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
22
2.4.2 Empirical Results
By adopting the Shin model (1993) as the starting point, a bookmaker faces a bunch
of informed punters and some outsiders. With probability z, an informed trader
is drawn to place a bet. We assume that the insider is allowed to observe what
the winning horse is and buy tickets up to £ 1 at the fixed prices. Outsiders are
unknown to the identity of the winning horse. If there are n horses in a race, the
ith horse wins with probability pi (i = 1,2, · · · ,n). With probability (1− z)pi, the
outsider who believes that the horse i wins is chosen to be the punter. Let p denote
the vector of winning probabilities (p1, p2, ..., pn) and π be the vector of starting
prices (π1, π2, ..., πn). With some twist of terminology, let Var(p) denote the
‘variance’ of p, where Var(p) = 1n ∑
i
(
pi − 1n
)2
and Var(p) is a scalar. Var(p),
introduced in the paper, is to help adjust the estimation of the degree of insider
trading. How we define Var(p) will be presented in Appendix A. Suppose that the
bookmaker’s winning bid is given by β. Since we assume the bookmaker’s revenue
is one pound, the optimisation problem becomes to maximise the expected profits.
maximise 1−
n
∑
i=1
zpi + (1− z)p2i
πi
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
≤ β and 0≤ πi ≤ 1 f or all i = 1,2, · · · ,n
By solving the above problem, we get
πi =
β ·
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i
n
∑
s=1
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
(2.1)
and
β =∑πs =
(
∑
s
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)2
(2.2)
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Substituting (2.2) into (2.1), we then get
πi =
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i
(
∑
s
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)
(2.3)
To get our benchmark polynomial regression model, Appendix A provides us
with the detailed information. With some twists, we obtain the following model.
D = z(n− 1) +
K
∑
k=0
aknkVar(p) +
K
∑
k=0
bknk[Var(p)]2 (2.4)
By applying Weierstrass Approximation Theorem, we get
D = z(n− 1) + a0Var(p) + a1nVar(p) + a2n2Var(p)
+b0[Var(p)]2 + b1n[Var(p)]2 + b2n2[Var(p)]2 + ϵ (2.5)
where D is the bookmaker’s over-round, which equals the sum of starting prices
minus one (e.g. ∑
s
πs − 1). a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2 are the slope parameters. Note also
that there is no intercept term in this equation, which means if there is no runner
in the race, there is no gain for the bookmakers.
The next step is to write the algorithm in MatLab8 and run the regression. The
results are shown on the next page. As we shall see, the estimate of z is stable
after the third adjustment. The initial estimate of z is from the ordinary least
squares regression of (2.5) in which Var(πˆ) is used as a proxy Var(p). πˆi here is
the normalised price of horse i, which equals πi∑
s
πs
. πˆ is the vector of normalised
prices. It appears in the first column of Table 2.2. This regression yields an initial
estimate of z of around 1.77%. The estimates of the adjustments of regressors in
Equation (2.5) appear in the successive columns of Table 2.2. It is worth noting that
all estimates are significant at the 1% level, except for the coefficients of Var(p)
which are insignificant at any level. The revised estimates of z converge to 1.7%
after two iterations.
8I am grateful to Xueqi Dong for her help on the MatLab coding process.
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Table 2.2 OLS Estimates of z
No adjust. 1st adjust. 2nd adjust. 3rd adjust.
n-1 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(71.494) (71.2831) (70.4653) (70.4705)
Var(p) −0.7283 −0.3601 −0.3473 −0.3473
(−0.9411) (−0.5715) (−0.5532) (−0.5533)
nVar(p) 1.0391∗∗∗ 0.7298∗∗∗ 0.7257∗∗∗ 0.7257∗∗∗
(5.6326) (4.842) (4.8384) (4.8385)
n2Var(p) −0.0972∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.0569∗∗∗ −0.0569∗∗∗
(−8.0785) (−5.8466) (−5.8561) (−5.8560)
[Var(p)]2 49.3209∗∗∗ 24.1781∗∗∗ 24.1441∗∗∗ 24.1444∗∗∗
(6.5459) (4.7248) (4.7307) (4.7306)
n[Var(p)]2 −34.8936∗∗∗ −17.7374∗∗∗ −17.7452∗∗∗ −17.7451∗∗∗
(−6.6316) (−5.3407) (−5.3521) (−5.3520)
n2[Var(p)]2 3.9318∗∗∗ 1.8138∗∗∗ 1.8197∗∗∗ 1.8197∗∗∗
(5.5752) (4.2184) (4.234) (4.2339)
R2 = 0.6702 R2 = 0.6785 R2 = 0.6787 R2 = 0.6787
1. t values are in parentheses.
2. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
Note: in this quadratic case, we adjust the regression results three times because the true winning
probabilities are unknown. So the normalised price πˆs = πs/(∑
i
πi) can be our empirical proxy for
the true probability. The iterative procedure is as follows. In the first step, we apply the original
normalised starting prices to the Equation (2.5) and get the estimation of z. In the second step, we
substitute z into Equation (2.18) in Appendix A. Then we use revised Var(p) to re-estimate z. In
the last step, we repeat step 2 until the revised values of z converge.
Table 2.3 Robust Test of z
No adjust. 1st adjust. 2nd adjust. 3rd adjust.
Quadratic 0.0177 0.017 0.017 0.017
Cubic 0.0179 0.0169 0.0169 0.0169
Quartic 0.0178 0.0169 0.0169 0.0169
Quintic 0.018 0.017 0.0171 0.0171
Sextic 0.0179 0.0171 0.0171 0.0171
Note: the OLS regression equation is D = z(n− 1) + K∑
k=0
aknkVar(p) +
K
∑
k=0
bknk[Var(p)]2. In the
quadratic case, K = 2. Here we test whether the quadratic case is enough for our research purpose.
So we let K= 3,4,5,6. It turns out that even the sextic case does not change the estimated value of z
too much. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the quadratic specification can be a benchmark
case.
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Now the robustness of the estimate of z is presented as we change k, i.e., the
degree of polynomial approximation. For each degree of the polynomial and for
each round in the iteration, the estimate of z is recorded. These estimates of z are
presented in Table 2.3. The columns indicate the number of iterations and the rows
indicate the degree of the polynomial in the estimated equation. Notice that after
the first iteration, the value of z converges to the same value and these estimates
are virtually identical. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the quadratic case
can be a benchmark case and it would appear that we have good reason to believe
that the estimate of z is acceptable.
2.5 Extension of the Shin Measure
The formula proposed in this part can be used to calculate z, which is defined
as the incidence of insider trading, for each race at opening and starting prices,
respectively. Starting from the following two equations, we can link the probabilities
of winning (p), the price of a ticket on each runner i (πi) and z.
β =∑πs =
(
∑
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)2
πi =
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i
(
∑
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)
Rewriting the above two equations as
πi√
β
=
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i (2.6)
This is easily inverted to yield
pi = pi
(
πi√
β
,z
)
=
√
z2 + 4
π2i
β
(1− z)
2(1− z) (2.7)
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∑
i
pi
(
πi√
β
,z
)
= 1 (2.8)
Since the sum of the probabilities must equal one, the estimation of z is done
by solving Equation (2.8). A programme had been written to numerically solve the
Shin model for the implied degree of insider trading in each race (see Appendix C).
As we see from Table 2.4, for the sample of 986 races in 2013 Yorkshire horse-race
season, the weighted average degree of insider trading at starting prices is 2.103%,
which is slightly higher than that estimated under the Shin measure (1.7%) with
a minimum value of 0.0004863 occurred at Thirsk racecourse and a maximum of
0.0488694 at Doncaster. Notice that we rule out 11 anomalies as the sum of prices
is less than one in those races which lead to the negative values. Another advantage
of this measure is that the weighted average degree of insider trading at opening
odds can easily be calculated following the same way. As can be seen from Table
2.5, for the sample of 982 races, the average value is 1.64%, with a minimum value
of 0.000182 at Beverley and a maximum of 0.053218 at Doncaster. At opening
prices, 15 out of 997 races have the negative values that need to be removed from
our sample set. For comparison, we only keep the races that have the positive
degrees, so in total there are 981 races remained. The Shin measure of insider
trading increases from opening to starting prices in 905 races, and decreases in the
rest 76 races. As depicted by Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the distribution of zsp is obviously
skewed to the left, so is the distribution of zop. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 describe a fact
that the Shin measure of insider trading at opening odds is lower than at starting
prices.
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Table 2.4 z for Each Racecourse at Starting Prices (2013)
Mean S.D Min Max Obs
Beverley 0.0232695 0.0056476 0.0015887 0.0462109 135
Catterick 0.0202013 0.005112 0.011867 0.0415089 125
Doncaster 0.021258 0.0056014 0.0118623 0.0488694 163
Pontefract 0.0206307 0.0059553 0.0047323 0.0455253 86
Redcar 0.0193934 0.0047464 0.012139 0.0313522 91
Ripon 0.0229091 0.0064364 0.0117921 0.0458977 107
Thirsk 0.0194775 0.0057961 0.0004863 0.0400381 97
Wetherby 0.021324 0.0070254 0.0131799 0.0455633 69
York 0.0194856 0.0037759 0.0142865 0.0346617 113
Note: this table summarises the average degree of insider trading for each racecourse. The degree
of insider trading for each race is estimated based on the method proposed by Jullien and Salanié
(1994). At starting prices, we rule out 11 races that have negative values of z, which leaves us 986
races for investigation. For comparison, we delete all the races that have a negative degree of insider
trading.
Table 2.5 z for Each Racecourse at Opening Prices (2013)
Mean S.D Min Max Obs
Beverley 0.0186074 0.0050934 0.000182 0.0371681 135
Catterick 0.0154645 0.0041342 0.0060564 0.0307309 125
Doncaster 0.0167703 0.0056476 0.0084087 0.0532178 163
Pontefract 0.0161782 0.0041872 0.0103552 0.0292508 85
Redcar 0.0150025 0.0032587 0.0088909 0.0235444 91
Ripon 0.0176198 0.0058318 0.0058933 0.0451168 107
Thirsk 0.0149567 0.0039767 0.010168 0.0298376 94
Wetherby 0.0164562 0.0050481 0.0107231 0.0374676 69
York 0.0156787 0.0039582 0.0015884 0.0384567 113
Note: this table summarises the average degree of insider trading for each racecourse. The degree
of insider trading for each race is estimated based on the method proposed by Jullien and Salanié
(1994). At opening prices, we rule out 15 races that have negative values of z, which leaves us 982
races for investigation. For comparison, we delete all the races that have a negative degree of insider
trading.
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of ZSP (2013)
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Figure 2.5 Distribution of ZOP (2013)
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Figure 2.6 ZSP Overlap ZOP (2013)
Note: For comparison, we display two histograms in a single figure. It is obvious that the degree of
insider trading at SP is, in general, larger than the degree at OP.
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We conventionally test market efficiency theory in terms of information, that is,
a market is efficient if the prices fully reflect all available information as described
by Dowie (1976). The available information contains historical prices, public and
inside or private information. In what follows, we address the issue of information
efficiency in betting markets, which is related to opportunities to earn abnormal
returns. In financial markets, weak form efficiency implies that there is no profitable
strategy that can be used to yield above-average returns by predicting future prices
from historical prices. Similarly, semi-strong form efficiency represents a situation
where it is not possible to earn abnormal profits based on the information that
is publicly available, while strong form efficiency denies the chance to get above-
average or abnormal returns on the basis of all information including private
information. Since the main purpose of this paper is to detect the incidence of
insider trading in 2013 Yorkshire horse race betting markets, we test efficiency
relating to the inside information, which is the existence of strong form efficiency.
In the context of the horse race betting market, the concept of “efficiency” needs to
restate. The added advantage of the betting markets is that there is a termination
point for each bet. If the market is efficient, the starting prices should reflect past
information on prices. More importantly, it should incorporate any inside or private
information. So bettors with superior information cannot earn abnormal profits
if they place a bet at the later stage, therefore the degree of insider trading at SP
should accordingly decline. It is obvious that the incidence of insider trading at
SP is higher than at OP from Figure 2.7. The reason why zsp is higher than zop
is that the sum of starting prices is bigger than the sum of opening prices. As we
see in Table 2.6, the adjusted final prices are larger than the opening prices in 3538
race runners. For the sample of 2920 runners, the starting prices equal the opening
prices. The opening prices are higher in 3314 race horses. The following is a test
for market efficiency.
If betting markets are efficient, the starting prices posted by on-course bookmak-
ers should reflect the equilibrium prices that summarise all the available information.
Punters with superior information, therefore, are not willing to place bets at the
final set of prices. Next, we perform the paired t-test, also known as the paired-
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Table 2.6 Summary Statistics for SP and OP
OP > SP OP = SP OP < SP
OP SP OP SP OP SP
Obs 3314 3314 2920 2920 3538 3538
Mean 0.1137 0.0969 0.9149 0.9149 0.1357 0.1609
S.D. 0.0921 0.0834 0.0916 0.0916 0.107 0.1192
Min 0.0066 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049 0.0039 0.0049
Max 0.6923 0.6522 0.7778 0.7778 0.9412 0.9524
Figure 2.8 The Density of the Difference between ZSP and ZOP (2013)
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samples t-test or dependent t-test, which is used to determine whether there is a
difference in the degree of insider trading in two related groups - OP and SP. To
get a valid result, we have to check whether there are significant outliers in both
groups and whether the distribution of the differences in the dependent variable is
normally distributed. From Figure 2.8, we find that there is no significant outlier in
our sample and the dependent variable is approximately normally distributed. The
result of the paired t-test in Table 2.7 significantly reject the null hypothesis and
accept the alternative that the mean of the degree of insider trading is not the same
in two groups. And µzsp − µzop > 0 is statistically significant. Thus we cannot
conclude that this market is strongly efficient.
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Table 2.7 Hypothesis Test Result
Paired t test
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
zsp13 981 .0210303 .0001799 .0056337 .0206774 .0213833
zop13 981 .0164279 .0001544 .0048361 .0161249 .0167309
diff 981 .0046024 .0001212 .0037946 .0043646 .0048401
mean(diff) = mean(zsp13 - zop13) t=37.9883
H0: mean(diff)=0 degrees of freedom=980
Ha: mean(diff)<0 Ha: mean(diff)!=0 Ha: mean(diff)>0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(| T |<| t |) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
2.6 Conclusions
Based on the Shin’s (1993) theory of insider trading in a horse-race betting market,
our study presents two methods to estimate the incidence of insider trading for
nine Yorkshire on-course markets in 2013. The estimation under the original
Shin measure is around 1.7%. It also demonstrates that there is a strong positive
correlation between the sumof prices and the number of runners. Inside information
on the part of punters might explain why total percent exceeds one in most races.
The betting odds on the day diverged across bookies might be a possible explanation
for the anomalies, but it is not always the case. The second method attempts to
compute this degree of insider trading at opening and starting prices for each
racetrack. From this perspective, we find that the weighted average value at SP is
around 2.103% and at OP 1.64%. Lastly, there is no evidence to confirm that this
market is strongly efficient.
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2.7 Appendices
Appendix A. Methodology: the Shin Model
Following the Shin’s theoretical model, the first assumption is that bookmakers are
perfectly competitive and risk neutral. The next assumption is that operating costs
are negligible and any profits are bid away. Under this circumstance, if there are no
taxes or levies and no inside information among punters, the sum of prices on all
horses should have paid one pound for sure at the end of the race. The divergence
of SP total percent from one shows how much the betting was over-round (i.e., the
bookmakers’ margin), which can be explained by the existence of inside information
on the part of bettors. Thus the probability of the Insider chosen to place bets with
the bookie is denoted by z. In what follows we assume there are n types of tickets (n
runners) in a race. Denote πi the price of the ticket and πi corresponds to the raw
odds of k to l (k/l), 0≤ πi ≤ 1 for all i. Now assume that any punter can only bet
precisely £1 on a particular horse. If horse i is chosen to bet by a punter, this means
1/πi units of the ith ticket are sold in the market. Let π be the vector of prices (π1,
..., πn) and the implicit total percent ∑πi ≤ β, where β is an upper limit on the
sum of prices for all horses in the race. Denote by pi ( i = 1, ...,n) the probability
of the ith horse winning the race and by p the vector of winning probabilities (p1,
... , pn), where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for all i and ∑ pi = 1. From the bookmaker’s point of
view, the Insider is chosen to be the punter with probability z and the Outsider
to be the punter with probability (1− z)pi. Conditional on horse i winning, the
bookie expects to pay z/πi to the Insider and (1− z)pi/πi to the Outsider.
The bookmaker’s total unconditional expected liabilities are
∑ pi
(1− z)pi + z
πi
(2.9)
Since the bookmaker’s revenue is one pound by assumption, the expected profit
is
1−∑
(1− z)p2i + zpi
πi
(2.10)
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which is maximised subject to ∑πi ≤ β and 0≤ πi ≤ 1 for all i.
Notice it is assumed that β ≥ 1, and negative total percent is ruled out in the
model. The solution of πi in terms of β, z and p is obtained by classical optimization.
πi =
β
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i
∑
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
(2.11)
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10), and since the expected profit must be zero in any
equilibrium, we get the expression of β.
β =∑πs =
(
∑
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)2
(2.12)
Substituting (2.12) into (2.11), we get the expression of πi in terms of p and the
parameter z.
πi =
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i
(
∑
√
zps + (1− z)p2s
)
(2.13)
The next step is to estimate the parameter z in which the Shin’s empirical model
employs the function F(pi) =
√
zpi + (1− z)p2i and its second order Taylor expan-
sion at the point 1/n which is F(1/n) + F′(1/n)(pi − 1/n) + 12F
′′(1/n)(pi −
1/n)2. Summing over i,
∑F(pi) = nF(1/n) + F′(1/n)∑(pi − 1/n) + 12F
′′(1/n)∑(pi − 1/n)2
(2.14)
Since ∑(pi − 1/n) = 0, the second term disappears. With some twist of termi-
nology, we define the ‘variance’ of p by Var(p), where Var(p) = (1/n)∑(pi −
1/n)2 = (∑ p2i /n)− (1/n2). Rewriting Equation (2.14) as
∑F(pi) =
√
1+ z(n− 1) + 1
2
nF′′(1/n)Var(p) (2.15)
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Now that the square of ∑F(pi) is equal to the sum of prices ∑πi according
to the Equation (2.12), we firstly take square for both sides of Equation (2.15) and
subtract one subsequently, then we get an expression for the over-round which is
denoted by the deviation D. Thus,
D = z(n− 1) + n
√
1+ z(n− 1)F′′(1/n)Var(p) + 1
4
n2[F′′(1/n)Var(p)]2
(2.16)
By applying the Weierstrass Approximation Theorem, we get
A = n
√
1+ z(n− 1)F′′(1/n) =
K
∑
k=0
aknk
B =
1
4
n2[F′′(1/n)]2 =
K
∑
k=0
bknk
Substituting these into (2.16), we get a linear equation in terms of the variables
(n− 1), (nkVar(p)) and (nk[Var(p)]2), where k = 0,1, ...,K.
D = z(n− 1) +
K
∑
k=0
aknkVar(p) +
K
∑
k=0
bknk[Var(p)]2 (2.17)
The above equation is the Shin’s empirical measurement of the incidence of
insider trading, which will be copied in the present paper. 9 The next problem is to
find out the values of the adjustment terms Var(p) and [Var(p)]2.
In practice, we do not know the winning probability vector p for sure, but the
normalised prices πˆs = πs/(∑
i
πi) can be a good proxy for the true probability. Let
πˆ be the vector of normalised prices. Based on Equation (2.13), the sum of squares
of the normalised prices πˆs is as follows.
∑ πˆs2 =∑
(
πs
∑iπi
)2
=∑
π2s
β2
=∑
(zpi + (1− z)p2i )β
β2
=
z+ (1− z)∑ p2i
β
9Shin. H. S. (1993). Measuring the Incidence of Insider Trading in a Market for State-Contingent
Claims. The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 420, 1141-1153.
37
and
Var(πˆ) = ∑
(πˆs − 1/n)2
n
=
∑[(πˆs)2 + 1/n2 − 2πˆs/n]
n
=
∑(πˆs)2
n
+
(1/n2)n
n
− (2/n)∑ πˆs
n
=
∑(πˆs)2
n
− 1
n2
In a similar way, Var(p) becomes ∑
p2i
n
− 1
n2
. Substituting out ∑ πˆs2 and
rearranging, we obtain an expression for Var(p) in terms of Var(πˆ),
Var(p) =
β
1− zVar(πˆ) +
β− 1− z(n− 1)
(1− z)n2 (2.18)
Thus, the iterative procedure for the estimation of z is as follows. In Step 1,
utilising the original vector Var(πˆ) as a proxy for Var(p) in Equation (2.17), by
running an ordinary least squares regression we get the initial value of z. In Step
2, substituting the initial z into Equation (2.18), we can calculate Var(p). Then,
applying the revised values of Var(p) to Equation (2.17) and re-estimate, we derive
a revised estimate of z. In Step 3, repeat Step 2 until the revised values of z converge.
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Appendix B. Algorithm in MatLab
The dataset is collected from a website called the sporting life (available from the
author on request). The significant advantage is that it is cheap and publicly
available. The disadvantage is the data are short lived, which is the main reason
that we only include Yorkshire racecourses in this study. The way to clean data is
as follows.
In the first step, we copy and paste from the website to an excel sheet. The
problem we encounter in this stage is that odds are in fractional form and the excel
sheet is in text form, which we cannot use directly to calculate z. So the following
example shows how we pick out columns from excel and transfer them into math
mode to do the calculation.
Using York Racecourse as an example, the rest just follow the same procedure.
The example of the form of the original data is shown by Figure 2.9, which is the
race taking place on 15th May 2013. If we only calculate the incidence of insider
trading at Starting Prices, all we need is the first column: number of horses in a
race; and the last column: SP. If we are also interested in the incidence of insider
trading at Opening Prices, the last lines in the third column under each horse are
very important. The MatLab codes show this picking process and how to transfer
odds format into (1/(SP+1)).
In the second stage, we count the number of runners in each race and sum each
horse’s prices. Then we put all data together to form a new file “data”. The last step
is to calculate variance and run the regression.
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Figure 2.9 Example of the Original Data
York Racecourse
15/5/2013
# Horse On-course prices Tote win Tote pl. SP
1 First Mohican 3/1 3.60 1.50 3/1
10/3
7/2
4/1
9/2
5/1
2 Lahaag 9/2 5.20 1.90 9/2
5/1
9/2
5/1
3 Clayton 6/1 6.40 2.20 6/1
11/2
5/1
9/2
5/1
9/2
5/1
11/2
4 Prompter 16/1 21.00 6.10 16/1
14/1
12/1
14/1
12/1
11/1
5 Fluidity 50/1 50.60 11.50 50/1
40/1
33/1
6 Ruscello 7/1 7.70 2.70 7/1
15/2
8/1
17/2
9/1
17/2
8/1
7 Alfred Hutchinson 33/1 53.00 10.80 33/1
8 Itlaaq 20/1 22.70 5.30 20/1
18/1
16/1
20/1
18/1
16/1
10 Bridle Belle 8/1 10.20 2.90 8/1
17/2
9/1
10/1
11/1
11 Silvery Moon 20/1 21.50 4.80 20/1
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First Step.
% MatLab Code
clear all;
clc
%read excel table
[num1,horse,raw1]=xlsread(’York 2013’,’A:A’);
[num2,op,raw2]=xlsread(’York 2013’,’C:C’);
[num3,sp,raw3]=xlsread(’York 2013’,’F:F’);
save(’horse’,’horse’);
save(’op’,’op’);
save(’sp’,’sp’);
load horse
load op
load sp
N = size(sp,1);
N1 = size(horse,1);
N2 = size(op,1);
SP = zeros(N1,1);
Horse = zeros(N1,1);
OP = zeros(N1,1);
%pick out SP
for i=1:N
a=sp(i);
b=cell2mat(a);
c=str2num(b);
if isempty(c)
SP(i+1)=0;
else
SP(i+1)=c;
end
end
%pick out OP
for i=1:N2
a2=op(i);
b2=cell2mat(a2);
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c2=str2num(b2);
if isempty (c2)
OP(i+1)=0;
else
OP(i+1)=c2;
end
end
%pick out horse
for i=1:N1
a1=horse(i);
b1=cell2mat(a1);
c1=str2num(b1);
if isempty(c1)
Horse(i)=0;
else
if c1<1 || c1>100
Horse(i)=0;
else
Horse(i)=c1;
end
end
end
SP=real(SP);
OP=real(OP);
table1=[Horse,OP,SP];
save(’table1’,’table1’)
load table1
table2=table1(3:3481,:);
M=[0,0,0];
L=3479; %change number here
for i=1:L
if i>=L
break
end
if all(table2(i,:)==M,2) && all(table2(i+1,:)==M,2) && ...
all(table2(i+2,:)==M,2)
42
table2(i:i+2,:)=[];
L=L-3;
end
end
A=table1(:,1);
B=table1(:,2);
C=table1(:,3);
I=find(A);
for i=1:1389
if A(I(i)+1)==0
B1(i,:)=B(I(i+1)-1)
else
B1(i,:)=B(I(i))
end
end
B1(1390)=20;
A1=A(I);
C1=C(I);
table3=[A1,B1,C1];
save(’table3’,’table3’)
load table3
horse=table2(:,1);
op=table2(:,2);
op=1./(op+1);
sp=table2(:,3);
sp=1./(sp+1);
table4=[horse,op,sp];
save(’table4’,’table4’)
Second Step.
%calculate op total price;
load table4
table5=[horse,op];
save(’table5’,’table5’)
result1=zeros(1000,40);
table5=[table5;[0,0]];
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n=size(table5,1);
j=0;
h=1;
for i=1:n-1
a=table5(i,1)
b=table5(i+1,1)
if b>a
h=h+1;
else
j=j+1;
result1(j,1:h)=table5(i+1-h:i,2);
h=1;
end
end
save(’result1’,’result1’)
N=nnz(result1(:,1));
final1=zeros(N,40);
for i=1:N
final1(i,1)=nnz(result1(i,:));
final1(i,2)=sum(result1(i,:));
end
final1(:,3:40)=result1(1:N,1:38)
save(’final1’,’final1’)
%calculate sp total price;
table6=[horse,sp];
save(’table6’,’table6’)
load table6
result2=zeros(1000,40);
table6=[table6;[0,0]];
n1=size(table6,1);
j1=0;
h1=1;
for i=1:n-1
a1=table6(i,1)
b1=table6(i+1,1)
if b1>a1
h1=h1+1;
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else
j1=j1+1;
result2(j1,1:h1)=table6(i+1-h1:i,2);
h1=1
end
end
save(’result2’,’result2’)
N1=nnz(result2(:,1));
final2=zeros(N1,40);
for i=1:N1
final2(i,1)=nnz(result2(i,:));
final2(i,2)=sum(result2(i,:));
end
final2(:,3:40)=result2(1:N1,1:38)
save(’final2’,’final2’)
A=final1;
A(:,23:40)=[];
B=final2;
B(:,23:40)=[];
save(’A’,’A’)
save(’B’,’B’)
Third Step.
function [NV,N2V,N3V,N4V,N5V,N6V,V2,NV2,N2V2,N3V2,N4V2,N5V2,N6V2]
= calV(V,cleandata)
n=cleandata(:,1);
N=size(V,1);
for i=1:N
NV(i,1) = V(i,1) ∗ n(i);
N2V(i,1) = n(i)2 ∗V(i,1);
N3V(i,1) = (n(i)3) ∗V(i,1);
N4V(i,1) = (n(i)4) ∗V(i,1);
N5V(i,1) = (n(i)5) ∗V(i,1);
N6V(i,1) = (n(i)6) ∗V(i,1);
V2(i,1) = V(i,1)2;
NV2(i,1) = V2(i,1) ∗ n(i);
N2V2(i,1) = V2(i) ∗ (n(i)2);
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N3V2(i,1) = V2(i) ∗ (n(i)3);
N4V2(i,1) = V2(i) ∗ (n(i)4);
N5V2(i,1) = V2(i) ∗ (n(i)5);
N6V2(i,1) = V2(i) ∗ (n(i)6);
end
end
% load the rearranged data
load data
cleandata=data;
cleandata(:,1)=[];
TF1 = cleandata(:,2)-1<0 ;
cleandata(TF1,:) = [] ;
save (’cleandata’,’cleandata’);
beta=cleandata(:,2);
n=cleandata(:,1);
N=size(cleandata,1);
Runner=cleandata(:,1)-1;
D=cleandata(:,2)-1;
for i=1:N
V(i,1) = sum((cleandata(i,3 : (n(i) + 2))/cleandata(i,2)).2)/n(i)− 1/(n(i)2);
end
[NV,N2V,N3V,N4V,N5V,N6V,V2,NV2,N2V2,N3V2,N4V2,N5V2,N6V2 ]
= calV(V,cleandata);
save(’var1’,’D’,’Runner’,’V’,’NV’,’N2V’,’N3V’,’N4V’,’N5V’,’N6V’,
’V2’,’NV2’,’N2V2’,’N3V2’,’N4V2’,’N5V2’,’N6V2’);
X=[Runner,V,NV,N2V,N3V,N4V,N5V,N6V,V2,NV2,N2V2,N3V2,N4V2,N5V2,N6V2];
b=regstats(D,X,eye(15));
Bb(1)=b;
BNV(:,1)=NV;
BN2V(:,1)=N2V;
BN3V(:,1)=N3V;
BN4V(:,1)=N4V;
BN5V(:,1)=N5V;
BN6V(:,1)=N6V;
BV2(:,1)=V2;
BNV2(:,1)=NV2;
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BN2V2(:,1)=N2V2;
BN3V2(:,1)=N3V2;
BN4V2(:,1)=N4V2;
BN5V2(:,1)=N5V2;
BN6V2(:,1)=N6V2;
for i=1:3
Z(i)=b.beta(1);
AV(:, i) = beta/(1− Z(i)). ∗V + (beta− 1− Z(i) ∗ (n− 1))./(n.2 ∗ (1− Z(i)));
[NV,N2V,N3V,N4V,N5V,N6V,V2,NV2,N2V2,N3V2,N4V2,N5V2,N6V2 ]
= calV(AV(:,i),cleandata);
save(strcat(’var’,num2str(i+1)),’D’,’Runner’,’V’,’NV’,’N2V’,’N3V’,’N4V’,’N5V’,’N6V’,
’V2’,’NV2’,’N2V2’,’N3V2’,’N4V2’,’N5V2’,’N6V2’);
X=[Runner,AV(:,i),NV,N2V,N3V,N4V,N5V,N6V,V2,NV2,N2V2,N3V2,N4V2,N5V2,N6V2];
b=regstats(D,X,eye(15));
Bb(i+1)=b;
BNV(:,i+1)=NV;
BN2V(:,i+1)=N2V;
BN3V(:,i+1)=N3V;
BN4V(:,i+1)=N4V;
BN5V(:,i+1)=N5V;
BN6V(:,i+1)=N6V;
BV2(:,i+1)=V2;
BNV2(:,i+1)=NV2;
BN2V2(:,i+1)=N2V2;
BN3V2(:,i+1)=N3V2;
BN4V2(:,i+1)=N4V2;
BN5V2(:,i+1)=N5V2;
BN6V2(:,i+1)=N6V2;
end
Z(4)=b.beta(1);
save (’Bb’,’Bb’)
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Appendix C. The Extension of the Shin Measure
We follow the same step to deal with the original data. The extension of the Shin
measure follows:
function [ p ] =indp(z, beta, pai)
% here pai is scalar
p = (z2/(4 ∗ (1− z)2) + pai.2/(beta ∗ (1− z))).(1/2)− z/(2 ∗ (1− z));
end
function [ rp ] =p( z, beta, pai)
% rp the is the sum of probablities minus 1
% beta is scarlar
% pai is a vector
p=indp(z, beta, pai);
rp=sum(p)-1;
end
load A
NN1=size(A, 1);
Z1=zeros(NN1, 1);
for i=1:NN1
beta=A(i, 2);
N=nnz(A(i, 3:25))+2;
pai=A(i, 3:N);
f=@(z) p( z, beta, pai);
Z1(i)=fzero(f, 0.2);
end
save Z1
xlswrite(’zop13.xlsx’, Z1)
load B
NN=size(B, 1);
Z=zeros(NN, 1);
for i=1:NN
beta=B(i, 2);
N=nnz(B(i,3:25))+2;
pai=B(i, 3:N);
f=@(z) p( z, beta, pai);
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Z(i)=fzero(f, 0.2);
end
save Z
xlswrite(’zsp13.xlsx’, Z)
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Chapter 3
A Further Examination of
Yorkshire Horseracing Betting
Markets
A gambler is doomed to lose even if he
constantly herds with favourable odds.
3.1 Introduction
The majority of economic papers on betting markets over the decades have been
concentrated on the discovery and explanation of anomalies that approve of being
supportive of market inefficiency. Another part of the literature has been focusing
on market microstructure theory, which investigates the theoretical conditions
under which the problem of insider trading deviates the equilibrium prices. As
betting markets are short-lived, they take advantage of not considering its funda-
mentals or future dividend when pricing state-contingent claims (the price of bets)
because a commonly acknowledged outcome is yielded at the end of the betting
period. Betting markets also share other features with financial markets, for exam-
ple, a publicly available cheap source of information (Racing Post, the Sporting Life
etc.), with hundreds of thousands of investors. In this paper, we continue utilising
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Yorkshire on-course horse-race betting markets to consolidate the results in the
previous paper and test some other results that widely spread in this field.
On-course horseracing betting markets are usually bounded in time and have
cash constraint. The betting period lasts for 20 to 30 minutes, and punters cannot
withdraw their decisions once the purchase is completed. Further, transactions
can only be made while the market is open, and thus any deviations of the final
set of prices from predicted equilibrium levels can be considered as the outcome
of some inefficiency (Schnytzer and Snir (2007)). Also if the market is efficient,
starting prices should reflect equilibrium prices that summarise all the available
information. Bettors with superior information are supposed not to take bets in the
later stage, thus the incidence of insider trading at SP should not higher than at OP.
Our findings demonstrate that the degree of the insider at SP is not only higher
at the average level but also larger at each racetrack, which means the Yorkshire
on-course betting markets are inefficient based on this data set. The paired t-test
can confirm this result.
Another interesting finding is that our data set can provide sufficient evidence
of the Crafts’ (1985) result that insiders tend to bet early with bookmakers. His
hypothesis also includes that “horses that exhibit large decreases in the odds against
winning in the betting period, known as plungers, have been hypothesised to be
indicative of insider activity” (Law and Peel (2002)). Our empirical results do not
conform to the hypothesis that plunger could be an indicator of insider activity
in terms of Law and Peel’s (2002) definition of a big mover. Compared with the
Shin measure of insider trading, movement factor plays a less important role in
explaining the rates of return.
Last but not least, we prove that the degree of insider activity has significantly
negative effects on the average rates of return at both opening and starting odds from
the punter’s perspective, which verifies a well-known stylised fact that bookmakers
respond to insider trading by raising their overall margin as well as biasing the odds
they set. A gambler is doomed to lose even if he constantly herds with favourite
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odds. The average loss to one unit stake on the favourite horse is estimated as
0.3314.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the dataset
and the empirical results. Section 3.3 summarises the empirical findings of the
paper.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
3.2.1 Data Analysis
The dataset in this paper includes 1265 races and 12205 runners at Yorkshire race-
tracks from 1st January 2014 to 28th December 2014, as reported by the Sporting
Life. For each horse we collect its opening odds and the starting odds. Opening
odds are the first set of odds posted by the on-course bookmakers. The last set of
odds posted by bookmakers before the race commences is known as starting odds.
We also collect the odds of favourite horses in each race, denoting as favourite odds
in this paper.
In order to proceed with our analysis, the following variables need to be defined:
OOji - The opening odds for horse i in race j.
SOji - The starting odds for horse i in race j.
FOji - The favourite odds for horse i in race j.
The relationship between prices and odds is as follows.
price =
1
1+ odds
Thus bets on the winner earn 1− price > 0 and bets on all other horses lose
the stake.
OPji =
1
OOji+1
- The opening price of horse i winning race j.
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SPji =
1
SOji+1
- The starting price of horse i winning race j.
sdummyji generates 1 if horse i wins race j and −1 otherwise.
f dummyji generates 1 if horse i is the favourite horse in race j and 0 otherwise.
Indicating by sdummy and f dummy, we can identify the winning prices and
the favourite prices from each race.
RateO and RateS are the rates of returns at opening and starting prices respec-
tively.
To capture the magnitude of the change between opening and starting prices,
the measure of movement is defined as follows.
mop = ln
(
1− op
1− sp
)
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics when we introduce the measure of
movement (mop). It is positive if the starting prices are greater than the opening
prices, 0 if sp = op and negative otherwise. In other words, odds are shortened
during the betting period. We then define a big mover as one for which the measure
of movement (mop) exceeds 0.05, which is similar to that reported by Law and Peel
(2002). With this definition we have 835 runners (6.84% of the sample of horses)
regarded as big movers from opening to starting prices. Table 3.1 also summarises
the average rates of return to one unit stake at OP and SP based on the mop. The
prominent feature of this table is that there are no positive returns at starting prices
for all ranges of movers. Only two positive returns occur at opening prices fell in
the range mop > 0, which is consistent with the Crafts’ (1985) empirical findings.
In order to confirm the above results, we also include the Crafts’ ratio and define
a big mover as the one in which the ratio of probabilities derived from starting to
opening prices exceeds 1.5. Table 3.2 is shown to describe the relationship between
average rates of returns and movers. Combining both ratios in Table 3.2, we find
that the rates of return at opening prices are positive and recorded at starting prices
are negative for all ranges of movers, indicating that there is supportive evidence
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Table 3.1 Movers and Rates of Return (MOP)
Range: mop N RateS RateO
> 0.05 835 −0.0535982 0.0084638
0∼ 0.05 3363 −0.0096033 0.0074582
0 3823 −0.0184617 −0.0184617
−0.05∼ 0 3879 −0.0112051 −0.0250121
< −0.05 305 −0.0116164 −0.0654312
Note that mop = ln(1− op)− ln(1− sp) is the measure of movement from opening to starting
prices. This ratio is positive if starting odds are larger than opening odds, which means horses
exhibit large decreases in the odds against winning, also known as plungers or steamers. As pointed
out by Law and Peel (2004), plungers are the ones for which mop > 0.05. They also suggest that
big movers from opening to starting odds could be an indicator of insider activity. Positive rates of
return are shown at opening odds when the ratio exceeds 0.
Table 3.2 Movers and Rates of Return (Crafts’ Ratio)
Crafts Ratio N RateS RateO mop Range:mop
< 0.5 3 −0.0297563 −0.070915 −0.043787 <0> 0.5< 1 4181 −0.0112218 −0.0279277 −0.0203571
1 3823 −0.0184617 −0.0184617 0 0
> 1< 1.1 842 −0.0055099 0.0088754 0.0232533
0∼ 0.5> 1.1< 1.2 1430 −0.0126534 0.0070402 0.0265483> 1.2< 1.3 875 −0.0235477 0.0050862 0.0372001
> 1.3< 1.4 497 −0.0366034 0.0003032 0.0459985
> 1.4< 1.5 164 −0.0100774 0.0321869 0.052975
>0.05> 1.5< 2 354 −0.0340944 0.0107195 0.0522392
> 2 36 −0.0499587 0.0259487 0.0868293
ALL 12205 −0.0159473 −0.0127332 0.0047535
Note that the Crafts’ ratio equals SP/OP. The last column of the above table shows the mop.
Combining both ratios, we find that the rates of returns recorded at opening odds are positive
and recorded at starting prices are negative for all ranges of movers. The empirical results are in
accordance with the findings reported by Crafts (1985).
of insiders tending to place bets at the early stage, which is consistent with the
Crafts’ (1985) results.
There are three differences from the original Crafts’ ratio. The first difference
is that forecast odds are excluded as the data that we use are not collected day by
day. The data set is all the historical prices including opening odds and starting
odds. Since opening odds reflect the forecast odds, informed information and public
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trends in the press (McCririck (1992)), and they are also the first odds posted by the
on-course bookmakers, it is more precise than forecast odds when we test whether
the markets are efficient. The second difference is that we exclude the extent of
movement from FP to SP and its reverse ratio in the present study. The third
difference is that we do not exclude the odds that are larger than 10/1 (0.090909).
Instead we bring in the measurement of movement (mop).
3.2.2 Test
ZSP and ZOP
Following the extension of the Shin measure from the previous chapter, we can get
the degree of insider trading at SP and OP respectively using the 2014 Yorkshire
racing data. For our sample of 1265 races, the estimated degrees of insider trading
at both starting and opening prices are given by the following tables 3.3 and 3.4,
respectively. The weighted average degree at the level of SP is estimated as 2.07%,
with a minimum value of 0.0014691 and a maximum of 0.095421, of which 11
negative values are deleted due to the fact that the sum of prices does not exceed
one. At opening prices the weighted average value is 1.65%, with a minimum value
of 0.0006524 and a maximum of 0.0959448. The negative degree of insider trading
is yielded in 21 out of the 1265 races. The degree of insider trading decreases in
108 races from opening to starting prices and increases in the remaining 1134 races.
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 describe the same features for zsp and zop.
Market Efficiency Test
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, if betting markets are efficient, the
starting prices posted by on-course bookmakers should reflect equilibrium prices
that summarise all the available information. Punters with superior information,
therefore, are not willing to place bets at the final set of prices. We also run the
paired t-test to determine whether the mean of the difference of zsp and zop is
the same. Figure 3.4 demonstrates that the dependent variable is approximately
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Table 3.3 z for Each Racecourse at Starting Prices (2014)
Mean S.D Min Max Obs
Beverley 0.0239868 0.0084675 0.0132433 0.0952211 131
Catterick 0.0202186 0.0092139 0.0025023 0.0917412 179
Doncaster 0.0207472 0.0081152 0.0014691 0.0759641 256
Pontefract 0.0202059 0.0049563 0.0132023 0.0440676 102
Redcar 0.0177758 0.004952 0.0032617 0.0403167 134
Ripon 0.0217448 0.0053365 0.0143872 0.049095 105
Thirsk 0.0213681 0.0105228 0.0080064 0.095421 107
Wetherby 0.0219475 0.0064094 0.0116605 0.0469832 125
York 0.018299 0.0032622 0.0082536 0.0325894 115
Note: this table summarises the average degree of insider trading for each racecourse. The degree
of insider trading for each race is estimated based on the method proposed by Jullien and Salanié
(1994). At starting prices, we rule out 11 races that have negative values of z, which leaves us 1254
races for investigation. For comparison, we delete all the races that have a negative degree of insider
trading.
Table 3.4 z for Each Racecourse at Opening Prices (2014)
Mean S.D Min Max Obs
Beverley 0.0190567 0.0064088 0.0035896 0.0668446 131
Catterick 0.0160973 0.0094212 0.0022536 0.0959448 177
Doncaster 0.0163892 0.0075561 0.0006524 0.0719377 254
Pontefract 0.0163647 0.0045722 0.0102278 0.033492 101
Redcar 0.0137984 0.0040969 0.0008263 0.0314539 131
Ripon 0.0165539 0.0044739 0.0065818 0.0366767 104
Thirsk 0.017703 0.0106591 0.0018628 0.0911478 106
Wetherby 0.0178254 0.0067011 0.0093708 0.042789 125
York 0.0154542 0.0028539 0.006057 0.0261539 115
Note: this table summarises the average degree of insider trading for each racecourse. The degree
of insider trading for each race is estimated based on the method proposed by Jullien and Salanié
(1994). At opening prices, we rule out 21 races that have negative values of z, which leaves us 1244
races for investigation. For comparison, we delete all the races that have a negative degree of insider
trading.
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of ZSP (2014)
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of ZOP (2014)
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Figure 3.3 ZSP Overlap ZOP (2014)
Note: For comparison, we display two histograms in a single figure. It is obvious that the degree of
insider trading at SP is, in general, larger than the degree at OP.
normally distributed and there is no significant outlier in our sample set. Thus the
result that we get from Table 3.5 is valid. We can conclude that there is a difference
in two related groups and the market is not strongly efficient.
Figure 3.4 The Density of the Difference between ZSP and ZOP (2014)
0
50
10
0
15
0
D
en
si
ty
−.02 −.01 0 .01 .02 .03
zdiff
58
Table 3.5 Hypothesis Test Result
Paired t test
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
zsp14 1244 .0207016 .0002138 .0075416 .0202821 .0211211
zop14 1244 .0165373 .0002011 .0070915 .0161429 .0169318
diff 1244 .0041642 .000115 .0040565 .0039386 .0043899
mean(diff) = mean(zsp14 - zop14) t=36.2070
H0: mean(diff)=0 degrees of freedom=1243
Ha: mean(diff)<0 Ha: mean(diff)!=0 Ha: mean(diff)>0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(| T |<| t |) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
Relationship between Winning Prices and Favourite Prices
Winning prices are the set of prices that represent a contingent claim to 1 if horse
i wins race j at the level of starting prices. Since the winning prices indicate the
actual results in each race, it can be considered as the unadjusted probabilities of
winning. Favourite prices are the set of prices that represent a contingent claim to 1
if horse i is chosen to be the favourite horse in race j. Due to the longshot-favourite
bias, bookmakers tend to underprice the favourites in most cases, which means the
favourite prices are always the highest prices in each race (High price, high winning
probability, shorter odds, lower return, vice verse). Our sample contains 1265 races,
of which 95 observations are deleted due to the fact that there is more than one
or no favourite horse in these races. The average value of the winning prices is
estimated as 0.2385, with a minimum value of 0.0099 and a maximum of 0.90909.
The average value of the favourite prices is estimated as 0.356, with a minimum
value of 0.11765 and a maximum of 0.90909. As we see from Table 3.6, among the
whole sample, 390 out of 1170 races have the same prices. This means that the
favourite horses are actually the winners in these 390 races. For the majority, the
winning prices are less than the favourite prices. Figure 3.5 also shows that the
favourite prices are larger than the winning prices. The winning prices are greater
than the favourite prices in only 4 races. Normally, the favourite horse is the one
with the shortest odds in the race. In reality, there do exist anomalies, but as can be
seen from Table 3.6, the difference between the favourite prices and the winning
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prices is very small. It approximately equals to 0. These results confirm that in
order to offset the negative effects of insider trading, bookmakers tend artificially to
bias the odds to distract punters and guarantee their profits or balance their book.
In order to obtain significance levels, we run ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression equations in which the winning prices are the dependent variable and
independent variables included the favourite prices and the Shin measure of insider
trading at starting odds.
Equation (1) in Table 3.7 is the winning starting prices regressed on a constant
over the whole sample. The estimated value is 0.2385, as reported above. Equation
(2) tests the relationship between the winning starting prices and the favourite
starting prices. The coefficient on the favourite prices is significantly positive but
less than 1, indicating the longshot-favourite bias and that market’s favourite horses
might not the best choice for outsiders. Taking the degree of insider trading at
starting odds into account, the adjusted R− squared is improving and zsp plays
an important role in explaining the winning probability.
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Figure 3.5 Winning Starting Prices versus Favourite Starting Prices
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Note: this scatterplot shows that the winning prices are always less than the favourite prices. Recall
that a high price implies a high winning probability, thereby giving the shorter odds in the fraction
form. So conventionally the favourite horse in a race is always the one that has the shortest odds.
The winning horse is not always the favourite horse.
Table 3.7 Regression Results - Winning Starting Prices versus Favourite Starting
Prices
Dependent Favourite
Eqs. Variable Constant Prices zsp R¯2 N
(1) Winprice 0.2385∗∗∗ 1170
(48.28)
(2) Winprice −0.0316∗∗ 0.7584∗∗∗ 0.4026 1170
(−3.05) (28.09)
(3) Winprice −0.0633∗∗∗ 0.6333∗∗∗ 3.6919∗∗∗ 0.4231 1170
(−5.62) (19.33) (6.52)
t scores are in parentheses.
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 0.1% level.
∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Test of the Shin Measure of Insider Trading on Average Returns
As can be seen from Table 3.8, Equation (1) is the average rate of return at starting
prices regressed on a constant for the whole sample. The mean value is -0.0167
which indicates the average loss to one unit stake on every runner in a race. Equation
(2) adds thewinning prices to test the relationship between the average rate of return
and the implicit winning probability on each horse for the whole sample. Notice
that the winning prices can be regarded approximately as the winning probability
based on starting odds. The coefficient on the winning prices is significantly
negative, indicating horses with a higher probability of winning lower the average
rate of return. The negative coefficient on the favourite prices in Equation (3) has
the similar effects as that in Equation (2). Putting the Shin measure of insider
trading at starting odds in Equation (4) significantly changes the coefficients on the
winning and favourite prices, which is not surprising at all because insider activity
is expected to depress the average rate of return on a massive scale. Bookmakers
ensure their profits by artificially setting biased odds so that the winning probability
and the favourite prices no longer matter in this case. These two coefficients are
relatively small compared to the significantly negative one on the zsp, which is
consistent with the Shin model. Taking into consideration of dummy, which takes
the value of 1 if the Shin measure of insider trading rises between opening and
closing odds and is 0 otherwise, and zop (the Shin measure of insider trading at
opening odds) plays no role in turning the tide, but the adjusted R− squared has
been indeed improved.
Table 3.9 reports 8 regression equations where the average rate of return at
opening prices is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are the same
as that in Table 3.8. Comparing with these two tables, we find out that the results
have not been changed too much except zop has more influence on the average
rate of return at opening odds.
Thus we conclude that the extended Shin measure of insider trading at both
opening and closing odds do significantly affect the average rate of return at both
levels.
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Movement Factor
As mentioned above, the movement factor (mop) is defined as the natural logarithm
of returns at OP over returns at SP, which gives more weight to the higher implied
win probability following the change in odds. A big mover is defined as when
mop ≥ 0.5. As shown in Table 3.10, Equation (1) regresses the rates of return at
starting prices on a constant, the measure of movement, f dummy (which takes the
value of 1 if a horse is chosen to be the favourite by the market and 0 otherwise)
and wdummy (1 if a horse wins a race and 0 otherwise). Equation (2) has the same
explanatory variables but a different dependent variable which is the rates of return
at opening odds. The results do not demonstrate a big difference except that the
coefficient on mop in the first equation is significantly negative while in the second
equation it is significantly positive. Dummy variables on the winning horse are
of vital importance in explaining the returns. Downsizing data set by filtering if
mop greater than 0.5 does not change the results too much. The coefficient on mop
becomes a negative value and thus has the negative effects on the rates of return
at opening prices. Lowering the returns at the early stage does not help to attract
punters with inside information take bets. Therefore based on our methodology
and data set, we cannot conclude that the plunger is regarded as an indicator of
insider activity.
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3.3 Conclusions
Shin (1993) has constructed a well-known theoretical model, which allows estima-
tion of the incidence of insider activity in the betting, based on the system in the
United Kingdom, from the profile of starting prices. Since this paper is an extension
of the previous one, we consolidate our results by applying a new data set collected
from Yorkshire racecourses in 2014. Given that this is the up-to-date information,
the time period in this set starts on the 1st of January 2014 and ends on the 28th of
December 2014. Besides starting odds, our new data set consists of opening odds,
winning prices and favourite prices. We conclude that the weighted average degree
of insider trading at starting odds is around 2.07% while at opening odds 1.65%,
which is very similar to the results that reported in the second chapter. There is
also no obvious evidence of market efficiency, but there is supportive evidence of
the Crafts’ hypothesis that insiders tend to bet early with on-course bookmakers.
Significance tests above suggest that of particular interest from the punter’s
perspective the average rates of return at both starting and opening prices are
spectacularly affected by the incidence of insider trading, which is consistent with
the results reported by Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) in a different way. Betting on the
favourite horse might not always the best choice for outsiders because there is an
average loss which equals 0.3314 per stake.
Finally, due to the constraints on the on-course betting markets that transactions
are made in cash and decisions are irreversible, some improvements to the model
and results are very likely if we explore exotic betting markets, that is, online
markets in the future study.
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Chapter 4
On the Determinants of Starting
Prices in Horseracing Betting
Markets
4.1 Introduction
As already acknowledged, panel data analysis has become increasingly popular
in the field of social science. A panel contains observations from different objects
over multiple periods of time. The use of panel data analytic applications by
researchers on economics, political science, sociology and psychology is extremely
common. In financial markets, panel data analysis mainly focuses on corporate
finance and asset pricing. But in sports betting (or gambling) markets, in particular
in horseracing betting markets, there is little literature employing cross-sectional
and time-series data sets to tackle the related issues. Although there is an extensive
literature of empirical studies on betting markets testing theories in financial
markets, for instance, market efficiency theory (see Vaughan Williams (1999) for
a survey. Parimutuel: Ali (1977), Snyder (1978), Figlewski (1979), Hausch et al.
(1981), Asch et al. (1984, 1986); Fixed odds: Dowie (1976), Crafts (1985), Gabriel and
Marsden (1990)), insider trading problem (Shin (1991, 1992, 1993), Jullien and Salanié
69
(1994), Fingleton and Waldron (1999), Cain et al. (2001)) and so on, it has provided
little guidance, to the best of our knowledge, to researchers as to determinants
that bookmakers will be taken into account when pricing horses. In this paper,
we examine the factors that affect the starting prices of horses through a unique
publicly available panel data set. The uniqueness of this data set will be described
in Subsection 3.1, but the reason why we are interested in this market is as follows.
Sports betting is a large and prominent industry around the globe. In the United
Kingdom, the gross gambling yield (excluding the National Lottery) is 7.1 billion
pounds during the period October 2013 - September 20141. Horse racing in the
UK and Ireland is exceptionally popular, in fact, it is the second biggest spectator
sport after football in Great Britain in terms of attendances. According to the 2013
study on economic impact of British racing conducted by Deloitte, there are around
5.6 million attendances at 1,369 fixtures2. Our attentions paid to the horseracing
betting markets not only because of the size of this industry, but the fact that this
market shares a lot of similarities with financial markets, such as a large number of
participants, the availability of public information and the uncertain future value
of the asset and so on and so forth. Unlike asset pricing, which is the mainstream
in the literature of financial markets, horse-pricing mechanism is barely reached
in economics. The main purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on
the determinants of starting prices in horse-racing betting markets. The second
purpose of this paper is to show that these factors are quite persistent.
As mentioned before, financial markets and betting markets happen to share
some similar characteristics as to the structure of the market. In contrast to the
betting system in North America in which the betting odds are determined by
the pari-mutuel method, the on-course horse-racing betting market in Britain
and Ireland is well suited for our investigation (Shin (1993)) due to the fact that
bookmakers set odds. This allows us to use methods that have been widely applied
1Gambling Commission - Industry Statistics April 2010 to September 2014.
2Economic Impact of British Racing 2013. Accessible via:
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EconomicImpactStudy2013.pdf.
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in finance to analyse the problem of pricing a state-contingent claim, which in this
paper is the price of the horse.
In what follows other features of the on-course horse-racing betting markets
and some terminologies should be brought in. On-course betting markets are
usually bounded in time and have cash constraint, the betting period lasts for 20
to 30 minutes, and punters cannot withdraw their decisions once the purchase
is completed (Schnytzer and Snir (2008)). Furthermore, transactions can only be
made while the market is open and in the end there is a definite and commonly
acknowledged outcome, which rules out the possibility of taking its future dividends
or fundamentals into account. Opening prices are the set of prices which are first
available to punters to bet on the course, while starting prices are defined as “the
odds at which a ‘sizeable’ bet could have been made just before the race commences”
(Dowie (1976)). Odds of a/b correspond to the price £ b
a+ b
in this paper, which
means the punter pays £ b
a+ b
for a ticket in return for £1 if that particular horse
wins.
The contribution of this paper is that we introduce panel data analysis to find
factors that have impacts on the starting prices, which has never been done before
in the betting literature. Due to lack of resources for some horses, our panel data
set is collected over unequally spaced time intervals. The panel is unbalanced as
each horse races at different time periods. The results we find in this paper are
quite fascinating. We provide empirical evidence to support the following factors
that are very significant in explaining the price of the horse, including the winning
potential (defined as 1− rank#runners ), the age of the horse, the weight the horse carries
in each race and the distance of the race. Our findings confirm that the condition
of the turf, the size of racetracks and the classification system affect the price as
well. Based on our estimation results, we can conclude that all these factors are
persistent.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives the outline of
our empirical model. Data description, variable classification and estimation results
are presented in Section 4.3 with relevant tables and figures. Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.2 Empirical Model
4.2.1 Basic Fixed-Effects Model
In this chapter, we are interested in explaining starting prices for each horse. By
adopting the fixed-effects regression model in Frees (2004), we consider each horse
to be a subject and differentiate among horses with the index i, where i ranges
from 1 to N. N is the total number of horses. Each horse is observed Ti times and
t indexes the historical order of the races that horse i participated to. With these
indices, let yit denote the response of the ith horse at the tth race. For each response
yit, there is a set of explanatory variables. If we assume there are K explanatory
variables xit,1,xit,2, · · · ,xit,K that may vary by horse i and race t, the K explanatory
variables can be expressed as a K× 1 column vector
xit =

xit,1
xit,2
...
xit,K

Alternatively, we use the expression xit = (xit,1,xit,2, · · · ,xit,K)′, where the
prime means transpose. Thus, the data for the ith horse contains
{xi1,1, · · · ,xi1,K,yi1}
...{
xiTi,1, · · · ,xiTi,K,yiTi
}
We allow the panel to be unbalanced and the number of responses varies by
horse, indicated by Ti. If Ti = T for each horse, the panel is balanced.
Consider a fixed-effects model, the relationships between the dependent and
the independent variables follow the regression equation
yit = αi + β1xit,1 + β2xit,2+, · · · ,+βKxit,K + ϵit (4.1)
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where the intercept terms {αi} are allowed to vary by horse, also known as the
unobserved time-invariant individual effect, and β1,β2, · · · ,βK are the slope pa-
rameters associated with the K explanatory variables. The error terms ϵit are the
regression disturbance. More compactly, the parameters can be expressed as a
K× 1 column vector
β =

β1
β2
...
βK

With this notation, we rewrite (4.1) as
yit = αi + x′itβ+ ϵit (4.2)
In this study, to investigate the relationship between starting prices and pricing
factors, we fit the following regression model:
SPit = αi + βLAGWIN1LAGWINi,t−1 + βLAGWIN2LAGWINi,t−2
+βAGEAGEit + βAGE2AGE2it
+βWEIGHTWEIGHTit + βDISTDISTit + ϵit (4.3)
where i = 1, · · · ,100 denotes the horses and t is the index of historical order of the
races that horse i participated to.
Equation (4.3) is our basic fixed-effects model. We also extend the explanatory
variables to include GOING dummies, RACETRACK dummies and CLASS dummies.
The full list of variables can be found in Table 4.3.
The fixed-effects model allows us to analyse the impact of variables that vary
over time and it explores the relationship between the response and the explanatory
variables within a horse. Each horse has its own individual characteristics that
may affect starting prices, such as the sex of the horse that remains unchangeable.
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Thus, employing the fixed-effects would remove the effect of the time-invariant
characteristics. We can assess the net effect of the explanatory variables on the
outcome variable. There are two important assumptions. First of all, we assume
that there is no correlation between the scalar disturbance term and the explanatory
variables. Secondly, we allow that αi and xit can be correlated. Since each horse
is different, the horse’s error term and the constant should not be correlated with
the others. To be more precise, we will present the results of Hausman’s test in
Subsection 4.3.3 to show that the fixed-effects regression model is appropriate.
4.2.2 Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors for Pooled OLS Es-
timation
Returning to our regression model in Equation (4.2), we now re-organise the model
as follows.
yit = α+ x′itβ+ (αi − α+ ϵit) = α+ x′itβ+ uit (4.4)
Equation (4.4) therefore can be expressed as
y=Wθ+ u (4.5)
wherey= (y1t11 · · ·y1T1 y2t21 · · ·yNTN)′, andu= (u1t11 · · ·u1T1 u2t21 · · ·uNTN)′.
W = (w1t11 · · ·w1T1 w2t21 · · ·wNTN)′, where wit is a (K + 1)× 1 vector of ex-
planatory variables whose first element is 1 and the rest is K independent variables
for horse i at race t. θ= (α β′)′ is a (K+ 1)× 1 vector of unknown coefficients.
In this case, we are assuming that E(u |W) = 0. Thus the error terms u are strictly
exogenous. θ can consistently be estimated by OLS regression, which yields
θˆ= (W′W)−1W′y (4.6)
Since we allow αi and xit to be correlated, uit and xit can also be correlated. We
therefore cannot use OLS regression because the estimation is inconsistent. The
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disturbances uit themselves are allowed to be autocorrelated, heteroskedastic, and
cross-sectionally dependent.
Therefore, this study reports Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and
Kraay (1998)) to mitigate the presence of cross-sectional dependence which has
been confirmed by Pesaran’s (2004) CD test.
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors for the coefficient estimates are obtained as
follows. It is the square roots of the diagonal elements of the asymptotic (robust)
covariance matrix3
Cov(θˆ) =
(
W′W
)−1 SˆT (W′W)−1 (4.7)
where SˆT is defined as in Newey and West (1987):
SˆT = Ωˆ0 +
L(T)
∑
l=1
(Ωˆl + Ωˆ
′
l)ω(l) (4.8)
and
ω(l,L(T)) = 1− l
1+ L(T)
(4.9)
In the above expressions, let L(T) denote the lag length up to which the resid-
uals may be autocorrelated and ω(l,L(T)) be the modified Bartlett weights that
ensure positive semi-definiteness of SˆT . It also “smooths the sample autocovariance
function such that higher order lags get less weight” (Hoechle (2007)).
The (K+ 1)× (K+ 1) matrix Ωˆl is defined as
Ωˆl =
T
∑
t=l+1
ht(θˆ)ht−l(θˆ)′ (4.10)
with
ht(θˆ) =
N(t)
∑
i=1
hit(θˆ)
3See Hoechle (2007).
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Note that the individual orthogonality conditions hit(θˆ) in (4.10) runs from 1
to N(t), which admits the following representation for pooled OLS estimation:
hit(θˆ) = witϵˆit = wit(yit −w′itθˆ)
N varies with t, which allows the Driscoll and Kraay’s original estimator to be
ready for use with the unbalanced panel.
4.2.3 Fixed-Effects Model with Driscoll and Kraay Standard
Errors
For the fixed-effects (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors,
the estimator is achieved in two steps. In step 1, we eliminate αi by transforming
all model variables as follows.
yit − y¯i = (xit − x¯i)′β+ (ϵit − ϵ¯i) (4.11)
where y¯i = T−1i
Ti
∑
t=1
yit, x¯i = T−1i
Ti
∑
t=1
xit and ϵ¯i = T−1i
Ti
∑
t=1
ϵit. Since αi is constant,
α¯i = αi, and therefore the effect is eliminated.
In step 2, we estimate the within transformed regression model in (4.11) by
pooled OLS estimation with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors as in the above descrip-
tion.
4.3 Data Analysis and Empirical Results
4.3.1 Data Description
To identify the determinants that can be utilised to explain starting prices in horse-
racing betting markets, we pick 100 horses with its lifetime results to form a
longitudinal panel from a website sportinglife.com, which is publicly available
to every individual. The data are comprised of combined races running at 101
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Table 4.1 Summary of Racecourses
Racecourse Course Type Races
United Kingdom
Aintree National Hunt 99
Ascot Flat/National Hunt 101
Cheltenham National Hunt 226
Doncaster Flat/National Hunt 56
Haydock Park Flat/National Hunt 78
Kempton Park Flat/National Hunt/All Weather 110
Lingfield Flat/National Hunt/All Weather 68
Newbury Flat/National Hunt 62
Sandown Park Flat/National Hunt 68
York Flat 64
Ireland
Curragh Flat 60
Fairyhouse Flat/National Hunt 57
Leopardstown Flat/National Hunt 121
Navan Flat/National Hunt 51
Punchestown National Hunt 129
racecourses in both the United Kingdom and Ireland during the period from 2006
to 2015, of which we pick up 10 racecourses from the UK including Aintree, Ascot,
Cheltenham, Doncaster, Haydock Park, Kempton Park, Lingfield Park, Newbury,
Sandown Park and York, and 5 racetracks (Curragh, Fairyhouse, Leopardstown,
Navan and Punchestown) from Ireland to detect whether larger and competitive
racecourses could affect the price of the horse. The reason why these 15 racecourses
are described as larger and competitive is because they all contain more than 50
races and in total it accounts for 52.39% out of our 2577 samples. As a matter of
fact, those 15 racecourses are indeed relatively large in terms of capacity, history
and big events and all course types are included. Table 4.1 gives the specific details.
The uniqueness of this paper lies in the way we arrange the data in the form
of a panel. Firstly, we label horses numerically so that 100 horses would be 100
objects in a cross-sectional dataset. For each horse we have all the entries and the
day the horse entered the race has the value of 1 and then labels sequentially up
to the latest race. To be precise, it is the separate cross-sectional dataset, which
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is similar to the panel data. Therefore the method in the study is the Panel Data
analysis, which has been widely used in the empirical research in recent years.
For each horse the following variables are collected: Starting Prices (SP), age,
position and a total number of horses in a race, the weight the horse carries, the
names of racecourses, the distance, the condition of the surface (i.e., going), and
the classification. In our sample, a larger number of horses start its career at the
age of four, and some of them start early (only at the age of two). The youngest
horse in the sample is only four-year-old and the oldest one is thirteen years old
in 2015. Table 4.2 and Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 summarise the data, listing its
lifetime results and some features of the horses. As can be seen from Table 4.2, the
data include 100 observations with an average of 25.77 races ran by each horse.
More specific, although this dataset is still unbalanced, we choose horses with at
least 16 runs but no more than 45 races just in order to, to some extent, mitigate
the effects caused by the unbalanced data. The place the horse was obtained can
also be found in Table 4.2. Horses win the first place 7.05 times on average and all
of them win at least once, in other words, there are no maiden horses in the sample.
Horses get the second place with an average of 4.14 times and the third 3.31 times.
The win percentage, as the name implies, represents the percentage of winning for
each horse and equals to First/Runs in this study. It can also be used to measure
the quality of the horses and averages 28.86% of winning. Red dash lines in Figures
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are 45-degree reference lines. As we see, all the dots are above the
line which makes perfect sense as no horse can be guaranteed to win or get the
second place or the third place every time they run a race. The outlier in Figure 4.1
represents the highest winning percentage in our sample set.
The principle of the level stake is that the total amount of betting funds is
divided by a number of bets that you want to stake and keeps staking on each bet
for evermore. It is the simplest among all staking plans and is somewhat beneficiary
of its simplicity. Once the amount has been worked out to be staked on one bet,
for the next thousand bets punter places the same amount, as long as we keep a
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics on 100 Horses
Runs First Second Third Win % £1 Level Stake
Obs 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean 25.77 7.05 4.14 3.31 28.86 12.83
S.D. 6.8547 3.2579 2.2474 2.1115 0.1383 17.6644
Min 16 1 0 0 3.03 -17.61
Max 45 23 11 10 76.47 74.88
Figure 4.1 Scatter Plot of Horses Winning First Place
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sensible number of bets under control, the chance of going bust is small4. As can be
seen from Figure 4.4, red dash line is a benchmark, which represents the average
amount of money staked on each horse in our data set. On average £12.83 staked
on each horse with a minimal value of minus £17.61 and a maximum £74.88. The
higher the level stake, the horse is more favourable in the market, so the winning
percentage is high accordingly as Figure 4.5 describes. Notice that the winning
percentage and the level stake are positively correlated, except that the level stake
can go negative.
4Accessible via: http://www.ukhorseracing.co.uk/faq/stakingplans.asp.
79
Figure 4.2 Scatter Plot of Horses Winning Second Place
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Figure 4.6 Winning Percentage vs. Level Stake
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4.3.2 Variable Classification
Dependent Variable
As we attempt to identify the relationship between the starting price of the horse
and factors that influence this price, starting odds are the best choice of the outcome
variable in the model with a slight change of its format. As we have discussed in
Section 4.1, for example, odds of 2/1 correspond to the price £0.3333 (1/(1+2)), which
means you pay £0.3333 for a ticket in return for £1 from bookmaker if that horse
wins. Otherwise, you just lose £0.3333. This price can also be roughly considered
as the subjective probability of winning for each horse in a race. The higher the
price, the bigger the subjective winning probability is. So the horse is favoured
in the market. Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 below depict the changing starting
prices during the entire races for 100 horses. Although most subfigures in these
four figures fluctuate significantly, there are some representative subfigures, for
example, horse 22 in Figure 4.7, horse 75 in Figure 4.9 and horse 76 in Figure 4.10,
which show that the prices keep at a low level and do not change too much. Those
are the ones who have a lower probability to win, also known as the underdog. The
other feature is that almost all the horses start at a lower price because it is the
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Figure 4.7 Starting Prices for Horses 1 to 25
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first time they enter a race. A low price is anticipated due to the fact that there is
no available information beforehand for both bookmakers and punters. In other
words, there is no previous record, i.e. no rank, which serves as a very important
factor in our study. For dependent variable, we should also notice that there are 9
missing data out of 2577 samples.
Explanatory Variables
Variables that affect the performance of the horse can be divided into three parts:
the first part is related to the horse per se, which includes its own age at the different
period of time, the weight the horse carries and the winning potential. Winning
potential, which represents the percentage of winning, can be used to reflect the
long-term quality of a horse. The second part specifies the details of racetracks,
which contains the names of racecourses, the distance the horse runs, post position,
weather, going conditions and the classification system. The final part concerns
jockey’s characteristics. In what follows we discuss each of these components.
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Figure 4.8 Starting Prices for Horses 26 to 50
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Figure 4.9 Starting Prices for Horses 51 to 75
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
51 52 53 54 55
56 57 58 59 60
61 62 63 64 65
66 67 68 69 70
71 72 73 74 75
sp
race
Graphs by horse
84
Figure 4.10 Starting Prices for Horses 76 to 100
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As measured by its winning potential, high-quality horses always attract more
attention from both punters and bookmakers. Measurements of winning potential
include races won and earnings. The more the level stake, the higher quality the
horse has. In this paper winning potential is equal to one minus its final position
divided by total runners in the race. If we hold total runners constant, the higher
value implies the higher rankings (1 is the highest ranking in this case). Given the
fact that the total number of runners varies from race to race in reality, 75 percent
could still imply the first place if the total runners equal to four. But still we can
conclude that, without loss of generality, the higher the value of winning potential,
the better the horse performs.
Age is assumed, to some extent, to be a factor that has an influence on the
performance of the horse. As races are restricted to particular groups, such as
maiden, juvenile or state-bred, by simply including the age factor to the model we
can control for the imprecision caused by the different level of the age of the horse,
especially in the case of juvenile races when horses have fewer past performance
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records. The effect of age on winning probability may be positive or negative. The
older the horse is, the more experience it can get, thus the higher the winning
probability. Up to a certain point, horses are too old to surpass other runners. Thus
we put age squared into the regression model due to the fact that the relationship
between the effect of the age and the price is non-linear.
The effect of weight is to make the fieldmore competitive, so the racing secretary
assigns more weight to better horses. Consequently, a higher weight would lead to
a decline in the winning probability, ceteris paribus. However, higher weight levels
always follow the higher quality horses, so there may have a positive relationship
between the weight and the horse. To conclude, weight to a horse is likely to be a
double-edged sword.
When it comes to the objective conditions of a horse race, taking racecourses,
distance, post position, surface and weather into consideration seems to be a
workable method. Unfortunately, post position (which is the horse’s stall in the
starting gate and theoretically an inside post position would improve the probability
of a horse winning because a slightly shorter race distance is involved) and weather
are currently unavailable in this study.
A horse running at a longer distance may not perform very well as it introduces
more uncertainty. With longer-distance races, horses are needed to be equipped
with the different requirements of pace, stamina and speed and also there is more
time for random events to occur. Luck, jockey’s quality or trainer’s strategy may
become more important. Therefore, the length of the race will have a negative
impact on the performance.
Racecourses per se implicitly reflect the wealthiness of the neighbourhood and in
turn, prosperous people tend to place more bets than poor folks, which would affect
the bookmaker’s pricing mechanism. Larger and more competitive racecourses
could result in a bigger margin, so we pick out 15 racecourses from both the UK
and Ireland to track its influence by setting dummy variables. It takes the value of
one if horses run at these racecourses and zero otherwise.
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As can be imagined that the going conditions can dramatically affect the out-
come of a horse race, so our model consists of the following ten goings: Good,
Good to Firm, Good to Soft, Good to Yielding, Heavy, Soft, Soft to Heavy, Standard,
Yielding and Yielding to soft. As an indicator variable, it equals one if a horse had
run on any of aforementioned condition, and otherwise takes the value of zero.
Note that there are 19 missing data in this group.
Horse racing classification system in the UK and Ireland is also very important.
Understanding the class system can be of benefit to the game players. “Each
horse has its own optimum level, whether it improves from a lower grade, it will
eventually reach a class of race where it simply cannot match the performance of
other contestants in the race”5. In other words, if a horse enters in a grade that is
too high, it will be outclassed by speedier runners. There are six levels of the class
included in this paper. Similarly, we assign value one to horses that belong to any
level of the group and zero otherwise. One issue on the classification might be that
there is a great deal of missing data (639 missing observations) in the sample.
The last component is jockey’s characteristics, which may be of secondary
importance in determining a horse’s overall performance. Provided that the data
on jockeys are not available, so this factor will not be considered in our model for
now.
All variables are listed in Table 4.3.
5Accessible via: http://www.horseracing-and-bettingsystems.com/horse-racing-class.html.
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4.3.3 Statistic Tests
Test for fixed versus random effects, tests for cross-sectional dependence and for
time fixed effects are firstly presented just in order to fully appreciate the estimation
results.
Hausman Test
In order to test for the presence of horse-specific fixed effects, it is common to
run a Hausman test and its null hypothesis states that the random effects model is
valid. The Hausman test statistic for fixed versus random effects specification is
51.41 (with P-value = 0.0000) as depicted in Table 4.4, which means that the null
hypothesis of no fixed-effects is rejected at the 1% level of significance. Therefore,
we can conclude that the pooled OLS estimation gives inconsistent coefficient
estimates by the standard Hausman test. As a result, the fixed effects regression
(4.2) should be applied.
Obviously, the above standard Hausman test that we perform is inconsistent if
cross-sectional dependence is present. Furthermore, we have proved the existence
of cross-sectional dependence in the following subsection. Thus, we perform a
Hausman test with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. The test statistic for fixed
versus random effects specification is 11.56 (with p-value=0). The null hypothesis
of no FE can be rejected at the 1% level of significance.
Combining all the Hausman test results, we reject the null hypothesis at any
level of significance. We therefore conclude that statistical inference from the FE
regression tends to be valid even if cross-sectional dependence is present.
Cross-sectional Dependence Test
In order to see if the residuals from a fixed effects estimation of the regression
model (4.2) are correlated across horses, Pesaran’s Cross-sectional Dependence test
(Pesaran’s CD test) is performed. The null hypothesis of the CD test states that the
residuals are cross-sectionally uncorrelated. Correspondingly, the test’s alternative
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Table 4.4 Standard Hausman Test
Hausman FE RE
Coefficients
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
FE RE Difference S.E.
LAGWIN1 .082758 .0937364 -.0109784 .0018605
LAGWIN2 .0283163 .0399569 -.0116406 .0018816
AGE -.0019486 -.0047611 .0028125 .0034257
AGE2 -.0004269 -.000215 -.0002119 .0002698
WEIGHT .4823472 .5627896 -.0804425 .0290235
DIST -.102901 -.0872259 -.0156751 .0094921
b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from xtreg
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(6) = (b− B)′[(V_b−V_B)−1](b− B) = 51.41
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
hypothesis is that cross section dependence is present. In this study, we perform the
standard Cross-sectional Dependence Test in Eviews 9, Pesaran’s statistic of cross-
sectional independence equals 2.19 (with p-value = 0.0285). Therefore, it comes as
no surprise that Pesaran’s CD test rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectionally
independence at the 5% level. Compared with other standard errors’ calibration,
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are much more appropriate since they are very
robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
Race-fixed Effects
In order to test whether or not race-fixed effects are needed, we use the command
testparm in STATA. It is a joint test to see if the dummies for all races are equal to
zero (i.e., no race fixed effects are needed). There is evidence that the F statistic for
race fixed effects is 1.26 (with p-value = 0.1241), therefore, the null hypothesis of
no race fixed effects is failed to reject. To conclude, the race fixed effects should
not be included in the model.
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4.3.4 Estimation Results
The model (4.2) is estimated by utilising 100 horses’ lifetime results in the study
dataset. The associated empirical results are displayed in the following six tables.
We report five sections of fixed-effects (within) regression results as well as Driscoll
and Kraay standard errors.
The first section runs the fixed-effects (within) regression equation without any
dummy variables. The first column in Table 4.5 describes the dependent variable in
this model. Adjusted R-squared and the number of observations are reported in the
last two columns respectively. The rest are the explanatory variables. In examining
the results displayed below, it is noted that two standard errors - FE standard
errors and DK standard errors - are showed in the two parentheses respectively.
14 different equations are regressed to test whether or not adding or deleting
variables would have an influence on the outcome variable (i.e., changing the sign
of the coefficient or its significance). The F-test of the null hypothesis that all the
coefficients in the model are equal to zero is rejected at the 0.1% level of significance
for most of the equations, except for equations (1) and (10). The first equation is
the starting prices regressed on a constant over the entire sample. The estimated
value is 0.2076, which also is the average value of SP. Note that the number of
observations is 2568 and there are 9 missing data. The reason why we include
the constant in the regression model is because whether or not the bookmaker
considers price factors, there is always a starting price for each horse. It is crystal
clear from equations (2) to (7) that the signs of the coefficients on LAGWIN1 are
all positive at the 1% level of significance under both FE and DK standard errors,
which is consistent with our prior expectation that there is a positive relation
between the winning potential and the price. In other words, higher values of the
winning potential imply higher rankings in the last race, therefore a higher price
should be anticipated when bookmakers set up the price of the horse in the present
race. Similar analysis is applied to LAGWIN2 where the winning potential is
lagged behind two races. The signs of the coefficients are statistically significant
and positive, but the values are lower than the coefficients on LAGWIN1 with
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approximately 0.05 decrease. Based on this finding, we can conclude that when
pricing a horse in a race, the information from the last race is more needed by
bookmakers than the one before. The effect of the age on the price is insignificant
at any level of significance, so does the coefficient of age squared, under both
methods of standard errors, which are inconsistent with a priori expectation that
there is a non-linear relationship between the age and the price. As mentioned
before, the weight the horse is assigned to carry may have a positive or negative
impact on the horses’ performance, that is, the horses’ prices. Results in Table
4.5 present a positive effect on the price. As the weight has been changed from
imperial units to metric units and then has taken the logarithm of kilogrammes, the
coefficient, for example in Equation (9), onWEIGHT means that Starting Prices
increase, on average, by 0.004188% when one more kilogramme is added to the
horses. Even when we add more predictors to the model, the coefficients do not
change too much and they all are statistically significant at the 1% level. For the
distance factor, we prove that the statistical inference on the DIST is consistent
with a priori theoretical expectation is that the longer distance leads to uncertainty
which would undermine the horse’s performance. Therefore, it has a negative
effect on the price and prices should reduce correspondingly. For example, suppose
that all other factors hold constant, one extra furlong leads to a decline in price
by 0.001029% in Equation (7). Last but not least, the number of observations is
changing as some of the variables have missing data, thus STATA automatically
deletes it. The adjusted R-squared reported in Table 4.5 is obtained from the horse-
demeaned OLS regression, which suggests that absorbing horse dummies helps
speed up exploratory work and provide quick feedback about whether a dummy
variable approach is worthwhile. It is noted that the estimated coefficients and
standard errors will not be altered in this method. Furthermore, a low value of the
adjusted R2 should be expected in the context of horse races since there are other
unpredicted factors existed, such as weather and a variety of constraints placed on
the competing horses. In the meantime, it is worth noticing that the adjusted R2 is
improving from equation to equation and the highest value 0.3211 is achieved in
Equation (7) when all explanatory variables are contained in the model.
92
The second section runs the fixed-effects (within) regression model with GOING
dummy variables. GOING represents the condition of the surface at racetracks.
Results in Table 4.6 explicitly shed light on how ten different going conditions affect
the main variables. Signs on LAGWIN1, LAGWIN2, AGE, AGE2,WEIGHT
and DIST have not changed at all, so do the significance. The adjusted R2 (equals
0.3404) is improved in this case. Our results also weakly support the assumption
that going conditions can dramatically affect the outcome of a horse race as 7 going
dummies are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
The third section can be divided into two parts: the regression equation with
ten British racecourses’ dummies is displayed in Table 4.7 and with five Irish
racecourses’ dummies presented in Table 4.8. As can be seen from Table 4.7,
when adding British racecourse dummies, the significance of AGE and AGE2 is
not improving. The last feature in this table is that almost all racecourses reveal
a negative impact on the price except for Lingfield Park racecourse, of which
DONCASTER dummy variable is not significant at any level under both methods.
Therefore, competing horses at the larger and more competitive racecourses in
Britain tend to be set lower prices to attract more punters. For racecourses in Ireland,
the signs and the significance of all the coefficients remain the same. 3 out of 5
dummies show no significance. Curragh is statistically significant at the 5% level
under the FE standard error, while under the DK standard error it is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Punchestown is statistically significant at the 5% level
only under the DK standard error. To sum up, the factor of racecourses in Britain is
of great importance than in Ireland when it comes to setting the price of the horse.
The fourth section runs the regression equation with the classification dummies
and the corresponding results are reported in Table 4.9. Class 6 is automatically
deleted by STATA because of the collinearity problem. Class 1, Class 2, Class 3 and
Class 4 are statistically significant, not only with FE standard errors but also with
DK standard errors. Including class dummies makes the coefficients on AGE and
AGE2 become significant and it also demonstrates a simple positive relationship
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between the age and the price and a negative correlation between AGE2 and the
price.
The fifth section adds all 37 available predictors to the model and also takes
horse dummies into consideration. The results can be found in Table 4.10. The first
thing that should be noticed in this regression is the significantly improved adjusted
R-squared (0.472), which is the highest value among all the equations. Thus, it may
be concluded that the model is explaining a statistically significant amount of the
variation in horse racing prices. The coefficient on AGE is significant under the
calibration of both standard errors at the 1% level, so does AGE2. In comparison
with the classification, going conditions are not important anymore. Racecourse
dummies still play an important role in this case.
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Table 4.6 Fixed-effects Regression Results (Including Going Conditions)
SP Coefficient Standard Errors Driscoll-Kraay
Standard Errors
Constant −1.6233 0.2459∗∗∗ 0.2178∗∗∗
LAGWIN1 0.0853 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
LAGWIN2 0.0312 0.0128∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
AGE 0.0013 0.0115 0.00997
AGE2 −0.0006 0.00088 0.0007
WEIGHT 0.4708 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗
DIST −0.0902 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗
GD 0.0214 0.0284 0.0254
GDFM 0.0631 0.0293∗∗ 0.0253∗∗
GDSFT 0.0297 0.0288 0.0223
GDYLD 0.0092 0.0366 0.0269
HVY 0.0735 0.0298∗∗ 0.0276∗∗
SFT 0.0628 0.0287∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
SFTHVY 0.0741 0.0342∗∗ 0.0308∗∗
STD 0.1037 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
YLD 0.0626 0.0339∗ 0.0305∗∗
YLDSFT 0.0764 0.0379∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗
Notes: 1. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
∗∗indicates significance at the 5% level.
∗indicates significance at the 10% level.
2. There are 2117 observations in this model.
3. Adjusted R-squared equals 0.3404.
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Table 4.7 Fixed-effects Regression Results (Including British Racecourses)
SP Coefficient Standard Errors Driscoll-Kraay
Standard Errors
Constant −1.6162 0.236∗∗∗ 0.1911∗∗∗
LAGWIN1 0.0866 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
LAGWIN2 0.0396 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
AGE −0.0064 0.0112 0.0104
AGE2 0.00016 0.0009 0.0007
WEIGHT 0.4792 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗
DIST −0.0738 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗
AINTREE −0.1158 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗
ASCOT −0.042 0.016∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
CHELTENHAM −0.1484 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
DONCASTER −0.0175 0.0205 0.0226
HAYDOCK −0.0477 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
KEMPTON −0.0444 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗
LINGFIELD 0.0563 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
NEWBURY −0.0599 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗
SANDOWN −0.0659 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗
YORK −0.0804 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗
Notes: 1. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
∗∗indicates significance at the 5% level.
∗indicates significance at the 10% level.
2. There are 2129 observations in this model.
3. Adjusted R-squared equals 0.3763.
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Table 4.8 Fixed-effects Regression Results (Including Irish Racecourses)
SP Coefficient Standard Errors Driscoll-Kraay
Standard Errors
Constant −1.5663 0.2455∗∗∗ 0.2207∗∗∗
LAGWIN1 0.0839 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗
LAGWIN2 0.0279 0.0129∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
AGE −0.00085 0.0115 0.0099
AGE2 −0.00049 0.00088 0.00076
WEIGHT 0.4825 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗
DIST −0.1059 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗
CURRAGH −0.0548 0.0223∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
FAIRYHOUSE −0.0313 0.0229 0.0303
LEOPARDSTOWN −0.00199 0.0165 0.0101
NAVAN 0.0132 0.0242 0.0185
PUNCHESTOWN −0.0273 0.0167 0.0128∗∗
Notes: 1. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
∗∗indicates significance at the 5% level.
∗indicates significance at the 10% level.
2. There are 2129 observations in this model.
3. Adjusted R-squared equals 0.3231.
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Table 4.9 Fixed-effects Regression Results (Including Classification)
SP Coefficient Standard Errors Driscoll-Kraay
Standard Errors
Constant −0.863 0.2923∗∗∗ 0.2963∗∗∗
LAGWIN1 0.0921 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
LAGWIN2 0.0617 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
AGE 0.0538 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗
AGE2 −0.00358 0.00099∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
WEIGHT 0.2816 0.0732∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
DIST −0.07228 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗
C1 −0.2595 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗
C2 −0.1964 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
C3 −0.1358 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗
C4 −0.0818 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗
C5 −0.0397 0.0249 0.0206∗
Notes: 1. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
∗∗indicates significance at the 5% level.
∗indicates significance at the 10% level.
2. There are 1674 observations in this model.
3. Adjusted R-squared equals 0.4243.
4. C6 is omitted due to collinearity.
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Table 4.10 Fixed-effects Regression Results (All)
SP Coefficient Standard Errors Driscoll-Kraay
Standard Errors
Constant −1.0846 0.2919∗∗∗ 0.3183∗∗∗
LAGWIN1 0.0889 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
LAGWIN2 0.0689 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗
AGE 0.0401 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
AGE2 −0.0025 0.00097∗∗∗ 0.00089∗∗∗
WEIGHT 0.3193 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗
DIST −0.0448 0.0225∗∗ 0.0196∗∗
GD 0.0076 0.0281 0.0246
GDFM 0.0336 0.02908 0.0288
GDSFT 0.0202 0.0282 0.0222
GDYLD −0.0698 0.0432 0.0323∗∗
HVY 0.0379 0.0307 0.0275
SFT 0.0244 0.0286 0.0295
SFTHVY 0.0277 0.0446 0.0436
STD 0.08 0.0315∗∗ 0.0344∗∗
YLD 0.0407 0.0412 0.0458
YLDSFT 0.0031 0.0629 0.0291
AINTREE −0.0853 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
ASCOT −0.032 0.0155∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
CHELTENHAM −0.1233 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
DONCASTER −0.0106 0.019 0.0228
HAYDOCK −0.0389 0.0172∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
KEMPTON −0.051 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗
LINGFIELD 0.0159 0.0222 0.0184
NEWBURY −0.0554 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗
SANDOWN −0.0474 0.0187∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
YORK −0.0629 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
CURRAGH −0.0387 0.0328 0.0189∗∗
FAIRYHOUSE −0.0535 0.0418 0.0457
LEOPARDSTOWN 0.0039 0.0264 0.0288
NAVAN 0.061 0.0409 0.0339∗
PUNCHESTOWN −0.0229 0.0281 0.0292
C1 −0.2094 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗
C2 −0.1625 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
C3 −0.1137 0.025∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗
C4 −0.0657 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0203
C5 −0.0301 0.0241 0.0214
Notes: 1. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.∗∗indicates significance at the 5% level.∗indicates significance at the 10% level.
2. There are 1665 observations in this model.
3. Adjusted R-squared equals 0.472.
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4.4 Conclusions
This paper aims at providing empirical evidence on the determinants of starting
prices in horse-racing betting markets by utilising a unique cross-sectional and time
series data set. Those determinants are discovered through an empirical analysis of
100 horses with its lifetime results from the year 2006 to 2015. We contribute to the
literature by answering the following two questions: (i) what are the factors that
can be used to explain starting prices in horse-racing betting markets? and (ii) are
these factors persistent?
Before we answer the above questions, three tests are performed because of
the uniqueness of our dataset. The result of Hausman test suggests that we should
employ the fixed-effects regression model. Pesaran’s cross-sectional dependence
test confirms the presence of cross-sectional dependence so that Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors are reported as they are robust to very general forms of cross-
sectional and temporal dependence.
There is a plethora of empirical evidence to suggest that the winning potential
(defined as 1-position/total runners in this paper) is quite significant in explaining
the price of the horse. Other factors, which include the age of the horse, the weight
the horse carries and the distance of the racetrack, are also important. Our findings
show that the condition of the turf, the size of the racetrack and the classification
of the race could influence the price as well. All the estimation results from Table
4.5 to Table 4.10 confirm that these factors are persistent.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Pricing in Horseracing
Betting Markets
5.1 Introduction
As horse racing betting markets provide economists with a ready-made laboratory
and brand new data sets, there are numerous empirical papers, which have examined
these markets from different perspectives by testing market efficiency theories,
explaining the favourite-longshot bias, or detecting the incidence of insider trading
and decision making under uncertainty and so on. The literature documenting these
problems covers both pari-mutuel markets, which prevail in North America, and
bookmakers markets in the United Kingdom and Ireland. This bookmaking system
can be traced back to the late 18th century and on average the bookmakers are the
winners in the punter-versus-bookmaker battle ever since the Parliament passed the
Gaming Act in 18451, which aroused our curiosity about the bookmakers’ behaviour.
In this paper, we will analyse the bookmaking market where the bookmaker serves
as a market intermediary who sets betting odds or prices for each horse in any race.
We aim to understand how odds are adjusted.
1See “All bets are off: why bookmakers aren’t playing fair” from The Guardian
(https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/aug/02/betting-horses-gambling-bookmakers-
accounts-closed).
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Despite the popularity of sports betting, there is not much theoretical work on
how bookmakers optimally set odds which guarantee non-zero profits. A series of
papers by Shin (1991, 1992 and 1993) proposes a theoretical model that determines
the prices of state contingent claims in the mimic market - the British horseracing
betting market - with the presence of bettors who have superior information. Fin-
gleton and Waldron (1999) generalise the Shin model by assuming that bookmakers
are risk-averse instead and face transaction costs in a non-competitive market.
Recently, Sandford and Shea (2013) address the problem of how bookmakers set
lines2. They mainly deal with sports like football or basketball which has point
spreads3. The focus of our paper is horserace betting, which is quite different
from football betting especially when it comes to adjusting odds during the betting
period4.
The objective of this paper is to
• Set up the general equilibrium framework, and
• Try and explain how the bookmaker adjusts the betting odds in a two-horse
benchmark model.
It is worth noting that in reality a rational bookmaker initially does not change the
odds constantly, especially not because of one punter’s particular behaviour unless
the bettor shows the appearance of bias in favour of one certain type of bet. This is
based on our observation of the market in the past few years for research purpose.
One possible explanation is that the informed punters do not show up until just
before the end of the betting period, which is not the case. Another explanation is
that the bookmaker is willing to take initial losses to collect information about the
2Line betting is a form of betting, which is used for events with two possible outcomes. In order
to equalise the money on both sides, the bookmaker handicaps a team by setting a margin, which is
referred to as the line. Accessible via: http://bet-types.com.au/line-betting/
3Point spread is defined as a measurement to determine the likely gap between the two teams in
the final result. It attempts to find which team is more likely to win, and by how much. Accessible
via: https://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/point-spread.aspx
4Horserace betting and football betting differ in two ways: (i) the outcome for horse race is
“win or lose”, whilst for football betting there is a point spread, which attempts to determine the
likely gap between two teams and to find which team is more likely to win, and by how much; (ii)
horses’ in-play performance has no effect on the odds-adjusting procedure, but football players’
performance influences the odds tremendously.
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informed traders as they are the main source of the bookmaker’s loss. We call this
the learning process. Our benchmark model, which focuses on the statistical losses,
offers a simple rule to find an optimal time to change prices.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a general equilibrium model
is presented by making use of the basic economic assumption that profit should
at least equal cost in order to keep the market functioning. More specifically, the
basic principle for bookmakers is to balance the total gains and the payoffs for
the winning horse. Our intention is to discover the prices at each stage of the
betting process dynamically. To the best of our knowledge, the model developed
in this paper is the first of this kind for this market. In order to make the general
equilibrium model tractable and obtain rich results, we start with a two-horse
benchmark model by assuming that two types of punters exist in the market,
i.e., informed and uninformed noise traders. Second, we make a methodological
contribution by introducing optimal stopping techniques into the betting literature.
Now we explain how the process of optimally adjusting odds can be formulated
as an optimal stopping problem. We present a continuous-time, two-state model
for a two-horse benchmark framework in which the bookmaker changes the odds
of horse A if the “high” state reveals or the odds of horse B should be adjusted
if the “low” state prevails. No matter which horse is chosen to adjust, the other
changes automatically. We assume that the cumulative sales of tickets on horse A,
net of the cumulative sales of tickets on horse B can be modelled by an arithmetic
Brownian motion with either a positive or negative trend. These are the two states
of the world: high state implies that informed traders know that horse A is going
to win; low state means horse B is more favourable among insiders. The true state
remains unknown ex ante, so the bookmaker has no information about which horse
the informed traders are backing. These two states decide the direction in which
the odds are changed. This information is gradually disclosed through sequential
observation of trades, acts as if a positive trend is observed at a certain point, the
cumulative sales on horse A exceed the tickets sold on horse B, the bookmaker,
therefore, determines that the informed punters know that horse A is the winning
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horse and adjusts the price accordingly. If a negative trend is revealed, the odds of
horse B should be changed.
Our model is analysed using Peskir and Shiryaev’s (2006) study of the Bayesian
problem of minimising the non-discounted cost of incorrect decisions in sequential
hypothesis testing in a setting in which the true state is slowly revealed through
a Brownian motion. Instead of analysing the non-discounted cost, we model our
Bayesian problem with Poisson jumps. By adopting Thijssen and Bregantini’s
(2016) model, we obtain analytical results, and we show that there is a unique
solution to the problem that gives both upper and lower boundaries in terms of
the posterior belief in informed punters knowing that horse A wins. The upper
boundary represents the trigger beyond which the bookmaker changes the odds of
horse A, while the lower boundary means below which the odds of horse B should
be changed. The “continuation region” is between these two boundaries, which
implies the bookmaker should keep observing.
The main analytical result of this study is that the decision bounds get wider as
the fraction of informed traders becomes larger, but the loss is non-monotonic even
though the wider bounds provide more information per time period. This happens
because of two opposing effects. It is quite straightforward that more insiders in
the market cause tremendous losses to the bookmaker, so, on the one hand, the
loss is increasing. On the other hand, a large proportion of informed traders means
the learning process is very informative, so the decision will be reached sooner,
which gives a declined loss function. In contrast with the standard real options
literature, which shows a higher uncertainty implies wider decision bounds and a
higher value of the project, our model finds that the posterior bounds get narrower
in the volatility as uncertainty enters as noise traders in the observations. More
uninformed traders provide less useful information, thereby explaining the narrow
bounds. The loss is increasing in the volatility as we expect the decision should be
taken at the early stage. Otherwise, a higher volatility makes the learning process
less informative, which leads to an increased loss.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We review related literature in
Section 5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we present our model with main results. The
comparative statics analysis is effected in Section 5.5. Conclusions are given in
Section 5.6.
5.2 Literature Review
This paper analyses an insider trading problem using optimal stopping theory.
Before we proceed to the analysis, it is helpful to briefly review the closely related
lines of research.
Insider Trading. The idea of insider trading is first introduced by Bagehot
in 1971. He specifically mentions that “every time one investor benefits from a
trade, ..., another loses” and the market maker always loses to traders with special
information and gains with liquidity-motivated transactors. The gains from noise
traders must exceed the losses to the informed traders. In our study, the bookmaker
is also losing to the insiders and breaks even on the uninformed one. Ever since then,
the presence of traders with superior information gets wide attention in the area
of the finance literature. Kyle (1985) develops a dynamic model of insider trading
where prices follow a Brownianmotion and the market maker can only see the order
imbalance. With sequential auctions, the informed trader makes positive profits
while the noise traders provide camouflage, but in the end all private information is
incorporated into prices. In the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model, traders with special
information and liquidity traders arrive as a Poisson process. The bid-ask spread can
be explained by adverse selection as well as the exogenous arrival pattern of traders.
The presence of insiders leads to a positive spread. Since the transaction prices
are informative, the spread declines with the trade. Back and Baruch (2004) show
that the Kyle and Glosten-Milgrom models were essentially modelling the same
phenomenon and they prove that the equilibria of the Glosten-Milgrom model
can converge to the equilibrium of the Kyle model. Shin (1991, 1992 and 1993)
extends the Glosten-Milgrom model into the horse-racing context and provides
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the empirical support for measuring the degree of insider trading in the British
horse-racing betting markets. Fingleton and Waldron (1999) generalise the Shin
model. They show that informed trading, the bookmaker’s attitude towards risk
and the bookmaker margin are three factors that determine optimal odds. Our
model only includes insider trading because we assume that the margin is competed
away. Schnytzer and Shilony (1995) provide the empirical evidence for the presence
of inside information on the Melbourne horse betting markets. Based on the two
segregated markets, they show that bettors with inside information, even someone
who is exposed to ‘second hand’ information, can change their behaviour and get
a rise in payoffs. Positive information can be of significance to predict a race’s
outcome. Gabriel and Marsden (1990) discover that Tote (Totalisator) returns on
winning bets exceed starting price returns which are paid out by bookmakers.
Cain, Law and Peel (2001) further prove that bookmakers pay more generously
on favourites than the Tote, but less generously on high odds bets. The difference
between those two papers is that the latter considers the incidence of insider trading
in the paper5.
Optimal Stopping Problem. There is a vast of literature that analyses optimal
stopping problems in real options models (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), but there is
no such analysis in the context of horse-racing betting markets. We introduce the
optimal stopping model into the field to figure out the price adjusting mechanism
- when and how the bookmaker changes the odds to minimise the losses. Our
paper is an extension of the simple sequential hypothesis testing with which the
non-discounted expected costs are minimised. It was pioneered by Wald (1945)
and further developed by Shiryayev (1967) who laid the foundation of this subject.
The optimal stopping problem in continuous time is analysed by Shiryayev (1978),
Øksendal (2003) and Peskir and Shiryayev (2006). Since the solution of the sequential
hypothesis testing problem can be reduced to the solution of the Stefan problem
with two boundaries and the solution method includes solving a partial differential
equation with smooth fit conditions, Shiryayev (1967) proves the uniqueness of the
5Cain, M., Law, D. and Peel, D. A. (2001). The incidence of insider trading in betting markets
and the Gabriel and Marsden anomaly. The Manchester School. Vol. 69, No. 2, p. 197.
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solution and provides analytical results. This is the starting point of our model. The
distinguishing feature of our setting, however, is that we are detecting a positive or
negative trend. Mostly, our paper is based on Thijssen and Bregantini (2016) who
study a two-sided investment/abandonment problem through a costly sequential
experiment that can provide the information about the true states of nature by
maximising the discounted expected payoffs, but in this study we minimise the
discounted cost of errors.
5.3 General Model
The Key Features of the Market.
The horse-racing betting market in the United Kingdom has some striking
features because of the odds-setting procedure in which bookmakers determine
odds rather than the parimutuel method in North America in which odds are
proportional to money wagered. A great number of traders are in the market,
among which some of them are endowed with superior information, and the rest
are just noise traders. Odds are changing all the time during the betting period
until the race commences. These provide us with a replicated market, which is a
particularly simple example of a contingent claims market. Consider an n-horse
race which corresponds to n states of the world in a market for contingent claims,
the ith state corresponds to the outcome in which the ith horse wins the race6. The
main difference is that in this market there is no need to take its future dividends or
fundamentals into account because of the fact that by the end of the race there is a
commonly acknowledged outcome, which gives certain payoffs. Another difference
is that the on-course horse racing market usually convenes for around half an hour.
So in general we present a finite time model.
Dates and Assets (Horses)
6Shin. H. S. (1993). Measuring the Incidence of Insider Trading in a Market for State-Contingent
Claims. The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 420, p. 1142.
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In the on-course horse racing betting market, there are two significant dates
- at time t = 1 the market opens for trading; and at time t = T the market closes
right before the race commences. During the betting period there are finite dates at
which the only one risk-neutral bookmaker that we assume in the paper changes
betting odds based on the observations of the cumulative sales for each horse. Let
t = {1,2, ...,T} denote a set of times and at each time there is a new set of prices
for each horse in which it could be the change for one horse or adjusting many
horses simultaneously.
Horses are indexed by i = {1,2, ...,N}, which implies there are N horses in a
race. Let Pti denote the price of the ticket for horse i at time t
7. Note that there are
two terminologies; one is the opening odds which are the set of prices for N horses
at time t = 1 and the other is called the starting prices which are the prices at time
t = T. Denote Qti be the number of tickets sold for horse i at time t.
Bookmaker’s Problem
No-Arbitrage Condition. “Arbitrage” in finance theory is defined as a trading
strategy that generates a risk-less profit. In the context of horse racing betting
market, the arbitrage opportunity implies that if, at any time, the sum of all the
odds is no larger than £1, there is a chance that punters can buy all horses and
get £1 for sure in the end no matter which horse wins. In order to avoid that, at
each point in time, the bookmaker should set the prices which satisfy the following
conditions:
P11 + P
1
2 + · · ·+ P1N ≥ 1
P21 + P
2
2 + · · ·+ P2N ≥ 1
...
PT1 + P
T
2 + · · ·+ PTN ≥ 1
In general, the goal of the bookmaker is to maximise the profits or at least make
ends meet. For convenience, we assume zero expected profits condition in our
7For simplicity, we rearrange Pti =
1
odds+1 , so 0< P
t
i ≤ 1. In this setup, the bookmaker pays
out £1 if horse i wins, otherwise (s)he gains Pti .
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model and the conditions above ensure that there is no arbitrage opportunity either.
So the total revenue is given by
P11 ∗Q11 + P12 ∗Q12 + · · ·+ P1NQ1N+
P21 ∗Q21 + P22 ∗Q22 + · · ·+ P2NQ2N+
...
PT1 ∗QT1 + PT2 ∗QT2 + · · ·+ PTNQTN
= ∑Ni=1∑
T
t=1 P
t
iQ
t
i
Since we assume the winning horse gets everything, the cost for the bookmaker
is unknown ex ante, but it will be realised at the end of the race. Therefore, the
ex post total payout is ∑Tt=1Qti if horse i wins. In both theory and reality, the
total revenue should be no less than the total payout for the bookmaker, that is,
∑Ni=1∑
T
t=1 P
t
iQ
t
i ≥ ∑Tt=1Qti for i = 1,2, ...,N. Otherwise there is no incentive to
keep the market functioning. However, the winning horse is not directly observable
ex ante. How does the bookmaker adjust the odds over the betting period under this
circumstance? It is when the zero expected profits condition kicks in. In general
this condition should only be satisfied at final time T, but in our model we assume
that the bookmaker has to make sure the expected profits are zero at each point
in time when (s)he changes the prices, that is, ERt = ECt, where ERt denotes the
expected value of revenue at time t and ECt is the expected value of cost at time t.
For any i and t (∀i,∀t), the following condition meets
E
[
T
∑
s=1
Psi Q
s
i | Q1i , · · ·Qt−1i
]
=
t−1
∑
s=1
Psi Q
s
i + E
[
T
∑
s=t−1
Psi Q
s
i | Q1i , · · ·Qt−1i
]
= E
[
T
∑
s=1
Qsi | Q1i , · · ·Qt−1i
]
Two-horse Framework
In what follows we describe the market in which there is a two-horse race
surrounding. Consider a bookmaker who sets betting odds for two horses in the
race. Unlike betting activity in other sports games where bookmakers are allowed to
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change odds during the game basedmainly on players’ performance (football, tennis
etc.), we pay particular attention to horse racing because of the short racing period
during which it is not suitable to adjust the price. If horses’ in-game performance
has little effect on the price-adjusting process, bookmakers can only rely on the
demanding for each horse to update the betting odds. At any point in time, the
bookmaker faces a two-sided decision: either changing the price of horse A or the
price of horse B.
Since the purpose of the economic activity is all about the profitability of the
project, there is no doubt that the bookmaker always tries to guarantee his(her)
profits by setting prices in which the summation of all the odds should be larger
or equal to one no matter which horse wins, otherwise there exists an arbitrage
opportunity. The over-roundness which is a means of expressing to what extent
the odds are in favour of the bookmaker is the bookmaker’s profit margins, also
known as profits in an economic sense. For convenience, we simply assume there is
no net profit for the bookmaker and if there are two horses in a race, PA + PB = 1
where PA denotes the price for horse A, and PB the price for horse B. Therefore,
adjusting one price would cause a change in the other automatically. It is worth
noting that the cost per ticket is £1, which means the bookie pays out £1 for the
winning horse per ticket sold. If all punters in the market are noise traders who are
indifferent between two horses, the only criterion for them to pick a horse is to
observe the given odds. In this case, the fair price is one half each and there is also
no need to change the price because the uninformed putters go with each horse
with probability 1/2. However, this is not the truth - bookmakers change the odds
all the time, so there must be some traders who are privileged. Those people are
endowed with information of which horse is going to win, also known as Informed
traders. Because of the existence of insiders, bookmakers face uncertainty when
setting up the betting odds.
Informed Traders and Uninformed ‘Noise’ Traders
Informed traders have empirically been proved their existence in this market.
Suppose that the fraction of informed traders is denoted by µ, thus the proportion
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of uninformed punters is σ ≤ 1− µ. Insiders are assumed to know which horse
is going to win, while the uninformed ones, whose valuations are uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [0,1], have their own subjective winning probabilities for
each horse respectively. It is no surprise that the bookmaker is definitely losing to
informed bettors, but (s)he can try to break even on the uninformed.
Discrete-time versus Continuous-time
The model we described above is obviously a finite discrete-time model with
t= 1,2, · · · ,T, but the model we are going to present is an infinite continuous-time
model. The following argument shows how we link them. The general model
provides a framework that satisfies the equilibrium condition in the market, but
in this paper we are more interested in the one period, for example, say from the
opening odds to the first time the bookmaker changes the prices.
Inwhat followswe showhow a discrete timemodel can converge to a continuous
time arithmetic Brownian motion. Suppose t is the first time that the bookmaker
stops the learning process and makes the decision. Now consider a time interval
[0, t], which we partition into n parts of equal length dt= t/n. We will be interested
in the limit as n → ∞, which implies that dt → 0. Now consider a binomial
tree with cumulative sales going up or down. Over a small time interval dt, we
expect the net cumulative sales to go up by u = θµdt+ σ
√
dt and to go down by
d = θµdt− σ√dt, where µ is the fraction of informed traders and σ ≤ 1− µ is
the fraction of uninformed noise traders as defined in the previous subsection. θ
is the hypothesis that we are going to test. The net cumulative sales depend on
what the informed traders know. If they know that horse A is going to win, all the
net cumulative sales will go up. Otherwise they will go down. So θ is going to be
either 1 or−1. The√dt term here is to keep the variance of the cumulative relative
sales finite when we take the limit dt→ 0. Each of these movements is assumed
to occur with probability p = 12 . Let X1,X2, · · · ,Xn be a sequence of independent
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and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables with
Xi =
θµdt+ σ
√
dt w.p. 1/2
θµdt− σ√dt w.p. 1/2
Note that E[Xi] = θµdt and Var[Xi] = σ2dt.8 Applying the Central Limit
Theorem, we get9
√
n
X¯n − θµdt
σ
√
dt
d−→ N(0,1)
where X¯n = 1n
n
∑
i=1
Xi.
Thus, the distribution of X¯n becomes approximately normal if n gets large
enough, which can be written as10
X¯n
A∼ N(θµdt,σ2dt/n)
Let the sequence S1,S2, · · · describe a stochastic process with Sn(0) = 0. The
net cumulative sales after n-th trade are equal to
Sn(t) :=
n
∑
i=1
Xi = nX¯n
A∼ N(θµndt,n2σ2dt/n)
That is,
S(t) = lim
n→∞Sn(t)
A∼ N(θµt,σ2t)
We construct Brownian motion as a limit of binomial trees in discrete time. As
n→∞, for every t, S(t) has a normal distribution with mean θµt and variance σ2t,
which makes it an arithmetic Brownian motion (dSt = θµdt+ σdBt, where Bt is a
standard Brownian motion.). Sample path of an arithmetic Brownian motion with
8E[Xi] = 1/2(θµdt+ σ
√
dt) + 1/2(θµdt− σ√dt) = θµdt;
E[X2i ] = 1/2(θµdt+ σ
√
dt)2 + 1/2(θµdt− σ√dt)2 = σ2dt;
Var[Xi] = E[X2i ]− (E[Xi])2 = σ2dt.
9Here d−→ stands for convergence in distribution.
10Here A∼ stands for "is asymptotically distributed as".
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Figure 5.1 Sample Path of an Arithmetic Brownian Motion
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a positive trend (θ = 1) is drawn in blue in Figure 5.1, while the red line depicts
a negative trend (θ = −1). Following the sample path, the bookmaker can decide
whether (s)he faces a positive trend or a negative one at the quickest possible point
in time.
Jump Process
For analytical convenience, we analyse a Poisson process with intensity λ that
jumps from 0 to 1. There are two reasons for introducing the jump process. First,
the infinite horizon model that we have already set up in the previous subsection
is not realistic as the betting period lasts for about 30 minutes in the on-course
horserace gambling markets. We know for sure that betting takes place over a
fixed time interval, the race will start at a certain point of time and the market will
be closed at the starting prices. However, the number of bets placed during that
period is unknown ex ante. To model this, we use an infinite horizon model, which
gets killed by the first jump of a Poisson process with intensity λ. If a finite time
deadline is imposed as we did in our general equilibrium framework, the problem
becomes much more difficult and can no longer be analytically solved. A jump
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process is just a mechanism to introduce a finite time in the sense that we can still
model our problem in infinite time horizon with all the analytical tools.
Second, note that “real time” and “model time” are not the same in our model.
Time here is defined by numbers of trades, which are uniformly spread out, because
we assume that the same amount of trade happens in every interval of time in the
infinite time horizon model. But of course in the real world, punters come and go
with no particular order. The trade does not happen at regular time intervals so
that the bookmaker does not know exactly how many trades are going to be made
and how fast the trade will come. So we redefine the time, not the real time, but
the time between trades which are to some extent random. We assume those times
are regularly interspaced. The intensity λ, mathematically, plays the same role as
a discount factor. Uncertainty over the number of trades that a bookmaker will
make during the fixed and known period of time that bets can be made, has the
same effect as having a discount factor in an infinite horizon model. Therefore
our model which has a random cut-off point is discounted at λ. In order to get
analytical results, we assume that there is a random process that determines when
the decision should be made. There is no discounting per se, but since trades do
not appear regularly and at some stage there are no more trades to be done, that is
when the bookmaker determines to end the learning period and changes the price.
The following shows how we mathematically transfer λ to a “discount rate”.
The way we deal with this problem is by assuming there is a Poisson process
(qt)t≥0, independent of (St)t≥0, with intensity λ and q0 = 0. Define
τ¯ = inf{t ≥ 0 | qt = 1}
Assume that the expected value of the project equals
F(s) = Es
[∫ τ¯
0
Stdt
]
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Since τ¯ follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ, we can write
F(s) = Es
[∫ ∞
0
StP(τ¯ ≥ t)dt
]
= Es
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtStdt
]
Our model can be used to explain why initially the price does not change very
often. One reason could be that the punters do not show up until just before the
race. Another explanation is that in the first period the bookmaker is trying to
collect the information about the informed traders. It can also be used to explain
why the bookmaker always sets the odds which add up to something more than
one. It is because in the learning period the bookmaker is going to make a loss, and
in order to compensate the loss, the bookmaker should set the odds that give (s)he
a profit margin to cover the learning loss. In theory, this profit margin would be
completely competed away.
5.4 The Optimal Stopping Problem and Main Re-
sult
The Stochastic Process
Recall that the bookmaker knows that there is a fraction µ of insiders, but that
(s)he does not know which horse the insiders are backing. If the initial price is such
that noise traders are indifferent, then their trades should be white noise. Let St
denote the cumulative sales of tickets on horse A, net of cumulative sales of tickets
on horse B. If we assume that punters arrive sequentially in continuous time, then
we observe
dSt = θµdt+ σdBt (5.1)
where µ > 0 and σ > 0 are constant, and (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion.
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The hypotheses that the bookmaker is testing are H0 : θ = −1 and H1 : θ = 1.
The intuition behind this is that if insiders know that horse A(B) will win we should
have a positive(negative) trend. The decision depends on the state of the world, θ:
conditional on the event {θ = 1} the bookmaker makes a decision to increase the
price of horse A as all informed traders are backing horse A, thereby decreasing
the price for horse B accordingly. However if the state of the world turns out to be
{θ = −1}, the price of horse B should be changed. The state is not known, but the
bookmaker knows π, the prior probability that the state is {θ = 1}.
Statistical Errors
As mentioned before, the bookmaker changes the odds based on which state of
the world is revealing. If the decision is correct, zero profits should be expected.
There is also a chance that the decision is wrong. What the bookmaker really cares
about is the loss of statistical errors.
Let Type I error denote the situation where all the informed traders know that
horse B is going to win, but the bookmaker thinks they favour horse A conditional
on the event {θ = 1}. A Type II error represents the opposite situation. In this case
the insiders are backing horse A but the bookmaker thinks horse B is their choice.
If these two types of errors occur, for example, the true state is {θ = −1}, but the
bookmaker decides it is {θ = 1}, vice versa, a huge loss is on the way.
The Loss Function
In order to derive a proper loss function, it seems appropriate to exclude two
extreme cases in the first step. The first case is that a rational bookmaker will
never set a price equal to £1 (£0) for either horse A or horse B because this price
immediately reveals the winning horse to the market. On the one hand, from
punters’ point of view, given that the odds are properly determined, if they purchase
the winning horse, there is no profit to earn as the cost of the ticket now equals
the return. If punters buy the other one, this is definitely going to be a loss. So no
punter is willing to be involved in such a market except for the informed traders
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who happen to have different information about the winning horse. From the
bookmaker’s perspective, on the other hand, (s)he takes a risk of setting the wrong
prices, which implies tremendous losses to the insiders.
In reality, a rational bookmaker would never set a price equal to one to break
down the market. (S)he is more willing to take losses to collect information about
the true state in which they make zero profits theoretically, and normally the price
will not be changed based on one person’s particular behaviour. Recall that this is
the bookmaker’s learning process.
The second case is that if we assume all punters are informed, the bookmaker
will learn in the first trade what the information the traders have and there will be
the loss if the price of the winning horse is other than £1. This is not the case in
our model either.
In what follows we derive the optimal price for horse A at time t if {θ = 1} and
the loss of the Type I error. In the current study we just consider if and only if the
fraction µ is informed, but the bookmaker does not know what they are - there are
two possibilities, either a fraction of µ of punters knows that horse A is the winning
horse or they know that is horse B. Let P∗A ∈ (0,1) denote the adjusted price for
horse A at time t conditional on {θ = 1} and we assume that the valuation of the
uninformed trader, denoted by V, is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1],
where 1 indicates that the uninformed punter is sure that horse A is going to win
and 0 indicates the other direction, that is, they are sure that horse B is going to
win. For informed traders, the loss the bookmaker makes is µ(P∗A − 1), whilst for
uninformed traders, the expected value is 1/2 and if the opening odds are such that
the noise traders are indifferent, which is 1/2, with probability 1/2 the bookmaker
encounters a noise trader who buys horse A, and with probability 1/2 (s)he buys
horse B. Once the bookmaker made a decision to set another price P∗A based on
sequential observations, the uninformed traders who are willing to buy the ticket
of horse A at that price are the ones who have a valuation that is higher than P∗A.
Punters who have a valuation that is less than P∗A are the ones who will buy horse
B. So with probability 1− P∗A, an uninformed punter buys a horse-A ticket and the
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loss is P∗A − 1 provided that the bookmaker decides that horse A is going to win,
and with probability P∗A, the bookmaker gets 1− P∗A from horse B and pays 0. In
total, the expected profit of a trade is
E(pro f it) = µ(P∗A − 1) + (1− µ) [(1− P∗A)(P∗A − 1) + P∗A(1− P∗A − 0)] (5.2)
Setting (5.2) equal to 0, we obtain
P∗A =
1
2(1− µ) (5.3)
where 0≤ µ< 12 . As can be seen from (5.3), if µ goes to 1, which implies all punters
in the market are informed, the price the bookmaker should set goes to infinity. In
this case no one is willing to participate in the market. If µ = 12 , P
∗
A = 1 and the
market also breaks down. The market is only functioning when the fraction of µ of
informed traders is less than half and the bookmaker gets a chance to break even
on the uninformed ones.
To sum up, the expected profit equals 0 if the bookmaker sets the price P∗A
conditional on the right decision (s)he makes and the true state is indeed {θ =
1} - all insiders are backing horse A. However if the Type I error occurs, with
probability µ, an informed punter appears and buys horse B instead of horse A
at price 1− P∗A and the loss to them is (1− P∗A − 1), and with probability 1− µ,
an uninformed punter shows up and buys horse A with probability 1− P∗A and
horse B with probability P∗A, the expected loss from the uninformed traders equals
(1− µ) [(1− P∗A)(P∗A − 0) + P∗A(1− P∗A − 1)]. So the loss to the Type I error is
as follows.
EA(loss) = µ(1− P∗A − 1) + (1− µ)[(1− P∗A)(P∗A − 0) + P∗A(1− P∗A − 1)]
= −µP∗A + (1− µ)P∗A(1− 2P∗A)
= − µ
2(1− µ) +
1− µ
2(1− µ)
[
1− 2
2(1− µ)
]
= − µ
1− µ (5.4)
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In expectation if µ= 0, the price P∗A =
1
2 and the punters are uniformly distributed,
the bookmaker makes zero loss. As µ goes to 12 , the price goes to 1 and the loss per
ticket goes to 1 as well. So the loss is bounded between 0 and 1, which is consistent
with our assumption.
The loss of the Type II error is also µ/(1− µ)11. Table 5.1 summarises the loss
of two types of errors under different states of the world.
Table 5.1 The Loss of Two Types of Errors
State of the world
θ = 1 θ = −1
Decision Adjust HA 0
µ
1−µ
Adjust HB
µ
1−µ 0
If the posterior belief in the event {θ = 1} at time t is pt ∈ (0,1), the expected
loss on the Type I error, denoted by L1, is
L1(pt) = pt × 0+ (1− pt)
(
µ
1− µ
)
= (1− pt)
(
µ
1− µ
)
(5.5)
Similarly the the expected loss on the Type II error, denoted by L0, is
L0(pt) = pt
(
µ
1− µ
)
+ (1− pt)× 0
= pt
(
µ
1− µ
)
(5.6)
Note that at time t the bookmaker will choose to change the price of horse A if,
and only if,
pt > p¯ ≡ 12 (5.7)
The stochastic process also indicates what the opening price should be at time
0. The way we are modelling the net cumulative sales is a Brownian motion and
11See Appendix A for more details.
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initially what the bookmaker is trying to make sure is that the expected profit
the (s)he makes on the uninformed traders is zero. So if the opening odds for
both horses are 12 and
1
2 respectively given that there is no informed trader in the
market, the uninformed trader buys horse A with probability 12 and horse B with
probability 12 . This gives us a binomial tree - the net cumulative sales could either
go up or down. In this case the loss per trade is always going to be 12 no matter
what information they possess or which horse they are going to bet because the
bookmaker is always getting 12 by selling both types of the tickets. For informed
traders, the bookmaker should have charged either 1 or 0 on a horse-A ticket, but if
(s)he charged 12 for horse A instead, the loss is also always going to be
1
2 per trade
on the informed traders. So the expected loss, as long as the bookmaker does not
make the decision, is µ2 + (1− µ)
[
1
2
(
1
2 − 1
)
+ 12
(
1
2 − 0
)]
= µ2 .
Therefore until a decision is reached the bookmaker is assumed to take a loss
for this learning process, from time 0 to τ the loss function is
L∗(p) = inf
τ∈T
Ep
[∫ τ
0
e−λtµ
2
dt+ e−λτ min{L1(p),L0(p)}
]
= Ep
[∫ τ∗
0
e−λtµ
2
dt+ e−λτ
∗
min{L1(pτ∗),L0(pτ∗)}
]
(5.8)
where T is the set of all stopping times. This is our optimal stopping problem.
Since (pt)t≥0 is Markovian, the optimal stopping problem (5.8) can be written
as
L∗(p) = 1
λ
· µ
2
+ inf
τ
Ep
[
e−λτ min
{
L0(pτ)− µ2λ ,L1(pτ)−
µ
2λ
}]
=
1
λ
· µ
2
+ inf
τ
Ep
[
e−λτ min
{
pτ
(
µ
1− µ
)
− µ
2λ
, (1− pτ)
(
µ
1− µ
)
− µ
2λ
}]
=
1
λ
· µ
2
+ inf
τ
Ep
[
e−λτ min{G0(pτ),G1(pτ)}
]
(5.9)
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Note that since we assume µ ∈ [0, 12), G0(·) and G1(·) are increasing and
decreasing, respectively. That condition also ensures that G0(0) < G1(0) and
G0(1) > G1(1). Note that p¯ = 1/2 is the unique point where G0( p¯) = G1( p¯).
This learning process reveals information about the true state of nature. We
model the optimal stopping problem (5.8) as one of Bayesian sequential testing
of two simple hypothesis in continuous time. In the Bayesian formulation of
the problem it is assumed that we observe a trajectory of the Brownian motion
S = (St)t>0 with drift θµ where the random variable θ may be 1 or −1 with
probability p or 1− p, respectively.
Following Peskir and Shiyayev (2006), uncertainty is modelled on a probability-
statistical space (Ω; F ; Pπ,π ∈ (0,1)) where for fixed π ∈ (0,1) the probability
measure Pπ is obtained as follows.
Pπ = πP1 + (1− π)P−1
where P1 and P0 denote the distributions of the observed process under H1 and H0,
respectively, with P1(θ = 1) = P−1(θ =−1) = 112. Recall that θ is the hypothesis
that we are testing, which takes two values 1 and −1 with probabilities Pp(θ =
1) = p and Pp(θ = −1) = 1− p.
Since our task is to test sequentially the hypotheses H1 and H0 with a minimal
loss, we observe the continuous process (St)t≥0. This process generates the natural
filtration FSt = σ(Ss : 0≤ s ≤ t), which is augmented with the Pπ null set.
12Suppose informed traders are not perfectly informed, then this P1(θ = 1) = P−1(θ =−1) = 1
is no longer what we are sequentially testing. Suppose informed traders are correct with
probability η > 1/2, then P(punter buys horse A | in f ormed) = ηP(horse A wins) + (1 −
η)P(horse B wins). We know that
P(horse A wins | punter buys horse A) = P(punter buys horse A|horse A wins)P(horse A wins)P(punter buys horse A) .
By applying Bayes’ rule, the probability that horse A wins given that punter buys horse A equals
the probability that punter buys horse A conditional on horse A wins times the probability of horse
A wins divided by the probability that punter buys horse A. In this chapter, we assume informed
traders know which horse wins. So the probability that informed punter buys horse A conditional
on the probability that horse A wins is 1. If the trader is not fully informed, the probability is not 1,
but η. If horse A wins, the probability that the informed traders will buy horse A is η and they will
buy horse B with probability 1− η. 2µσ that shows up in the volatility of the geometric Brownian
motion is going to change. The distance between µ and −µ becomes narrower because η ≤ 1. Most
analysis can go through, but we are learning less from the observations.
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Let pt = Pπ(θ = 1 | FSt ) with t ≥ 0, thus
pt =
π · exp
{
− (St−µt)22σ2t
}
π · exp
{
− (St−µt)22σ2t
}
+ (1− π) · exp
{
− (St+µt)22σ2t
}
=
[
1+
1− π
π
exp
{
−2µ
σ2
St
}]−1
(5.10)
and let the Radon-Nikodym derivative
ϕt =
d
(
P1 | FSt
)
d
(
P−1 | FSt
) (5.11)
defines the likelihood ratio process between the two hypotheses (ϕt)t≥0. It is a
well-known fact that13
ϕt = exp
{
2µ
σ2
St
}
(5.12)
and since (π < 1)
pt =
πd(P1 | FSt )
πd(P1 | FSt ) + (1− π)d(P−1 | FSt )
(5.13)
it follows that
pt =
π
1−π ϕt
1+ π1−π ϕt
(5.14)
Taking Ito differentials of the right-hand side in (5.12), we find that
dϕt =
2µ
σ2
ϕt(dSt + µdt) (5.15)
which follows the geometric Brownian motion dϕϕ =
(
θ
2µ2
σ2
+ µ
)
dt+ 2µσ dB.
From Ito’s lemma the right-hand side of (5.14) follows that
dpt =
2µ2
σ2
pt(1− pt)(1− 2pt)dt+ 2µ
σ2
pt(1− pt)dSt (5.16)
13See Shiryayev, A. N. (1978).
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Note that in our study pt = Pp(θ = 1 | FSt ) = Ep[θ | FSt ], then we consider the
process
Bt = σ−1
(
Xt + µt− 2µ
∫ t
0
psds
)
(5.17)
Combined (5.16) and (5.17), we obtain that (pt)t≥0 follows the stochastic differ-
ential equation
dpt =
2µ
σ
pt(1− pt)dBt, with p0 = π (5.18)
where (Bt)t≥o is also a standard Brownian motion, called the innovation process
(See Poor and Hadjiliadis, 2009). Using (5.12) and (5.13) it can be verified that
the process (pt)t≥0 is time-homogeneous and strongly Markovian under Pp with
respect to the natural filtration. Note that if θ = 1, pt
a.s.−→ 1 and if θ =−1, pt a.s.−→ 0
as t→ ∞. So, as t→ ∞, Var(dpt)→ 0 holds in either cases since Var(dpt) =
(2µ/σ)2 p2t (1− pt)2dt.
In what follows we adapt Thijssen and Bregantini’s model (2016) as the starting
point. With all the setup in mind we see that the closer (pt)t≥0 gets to either 0 or
1 the less likely that the loss will decrease upon continuation. This suggests that
there exist points pB ∈
(
0, 12
)
and pA ∈
(
1
2 ,1
)
, thus the state space (0,1) can be
divided into three regions. The first one is called the continuation region, which is a
region around p where keeping the price unchanged is optimal. It is denoted by
C = {p ∈ (0,1) | L∗(p) <min(L0(p),L1(p))} = (pB, pA)
where pB and pA, with 0< pB < p< pA < 1, are the boundaries for changing the
price of horse B and changing the price of horse A, respectively. When p gets lower
enough, we enter the adjusting horse B region, where the cumulative sales of horse
B are larger than of horse A so that we change the price of horse B. This region is
denoted by
DB = {p ∈ (0,1) | L∗(p) = L0(p)} = (0, pB]
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Conversely, when p gets large enough we enter the adjusting horse A region,
where we should increase the price of horse A, and this region is denoted by
DA = {p ∈ (0,1) | L∗(p) = L1(p)} = [pA,1)
It follows that the stopping time
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : pt /∈ (pB, pA)} (5.19)
is optimal in (5.8). The next step is to find a function L∗ ∈ C2 that solves the
following free-boundary problem

LL∗ − λL∗ = 0 for p ∈ (pB, pA)
L∗(pB; pA) = G0(pB)
L∗(pA; pB) = G1(pA)
L∗′(pB; pA) = G′0(pB) (smooth fit)
L∗′(pA; pB) = G′1(pA) (smooth fit)
(5.20)
Here L defines the characteristic operator (see Øksendal, 2005) of (pt)t≥0, i.e.
for any ψ ∈ C2,
Lψ(p) = 1
2
(
2µ
σ
)2
p2(1− p)2ψ′′(p) (5.21)
In order to derive the loss function of (5.8), we introduce the parameter
γ :=
1
2
√
1+ 2λ
(
σ
µ
)2
>
1
2
There are two fundamental solutions to the differential equation Lψ− λψ = 0:
ψˆ(p) =
√
p(1− p)
(
p
1− p
)γ
(5.22)
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ψ˘(p) =
√
p(1− p)
(
1− p
p
)γ
(5.23)
Note that ψˆ(·) is increasing and ψ˘(·) is decreasing and the general solution to
Lψ− λψ = 0 is of the form
ψ(p) = Aˆψˆ(p) + A˘ψ˘(p) (5.24)
where Aˆ and A˘ are arbitrary constants. Furthermore, it is easily obtained that
ψˆ′(p) = ψˆ(p)1/2+ γ− p
p(1− p) > 0, ψ˘
′(p) = ψ˘(p)1/2− γ− p
p(1− p) < 0
ψˆ′′(p) = ψˆ(p) γ
2 − 1/4
p2(1− p)2 > 0
and
ψ˘′′(p) = ψ˘(p) γ
2 − 1/4
p2(1− p)2 > 0
In Appendix C we show the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.1. Suppose that
1. 0≤ µ < 12
2. 1−µ2λ >
1
2 +
1
4γ
In the problem of testing two simple hypotheses H0 : θ = −1 and H1 : θ = 1 on
the observations of the process given by dSt = θµdt+ σdBt, the optimal decision
rules δ∗p =
(
τ∗p ,d∗p
)
exists and is
τ∗p = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | ppt /∈ (p∗B, p∗A)
}
,
d∗p =
1, p
p
τ∗ ≥ p∗A
−1, ppτ∗ ≤ p∗B
(5.25)
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and the loss function L is explicitly given by
L∗(p) =

p ·
(
µ
1−µ
)
if p ∈ (0, p∗B]
µ
2λ + vˆp∗B,p∗A(p)G1(p
∗
A) + v˘p∗B,p∗A(p)G0(p
∗
B) if p ∈ (p∗B, p∗A)
(1− p) ·
(
µ
1−µ
)
if p ∈ [p∗A,1)
(5.26)
where
vˆp∗B,p∗A(p) :=
√
p(1− p)
p∗A(1− p∗A)
(
1−p∗B
p∗B
p
1−p
)γ − ( p∗B1−p∗B 1−pp )γ(
1−p∗B
p∗B
p∗A
1−p∗A
)γ − ( p∗B1−p∗B 1−p∗Ap∗A )γ (5.27)
14and
v˘p∗B,p∗A(p) :=
√
p(1− p)
p∗B(1− p∗B)
(
1−p
p
p∗A
1−p∗A
)γ − ( p1−p 1−p∗Ap∗A )γ(
1−p∗B
p∗B
p∗A
1−p∗A
)γ − ( p∗B1−p∗B 1−p∗Ap∗A )γ (5.28)
are the expected discount factors of first reaching p∗B and p
∗
A, respectively, given the
current posterior probability p.
5.5 Comparative Statics
In this section we obtain analytical results on the posterior bounds p∗A and p∗B,
as well as the loss function given different parameters. In order to assess the
quantitative effects on the bounds, we consider the following base-case scenario.
Table 5.2 provides the parameters for a base-case scenario as well as the exact
values of the posterior bounds of p∗A and p∗B, respectively. For this particular case
we obtain p∗B = 0.2527 and p∗A = 0.7473.15 For different values of the posterior
belief in the event {θ = 1} the value of the loss is given by Figure 5.2. Note that the
curve line between the thresholds p∗B and p∗A shows the loss of waiting for beliefs.
14See Appendix D.
15All calculations are done by MatLab.
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Table 5.2 Parameters for a Base-case Numerical Example
Base-case Scenario
µ=0.1
σ=0.1
λ=0.1
⇓
p∗B = 0.2527
p∗A = 0.7473
Figure 5.2 The Loss Function
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The loss per trade given the different values of the posterior belief in the event
{θ = 1} is provided in Figure 5.2. The continuation region is between the threshold
pB and pA as the loss is higher if the bookmaker decides to stop learning and
takes action of adjusting the price. In order to guarantee the minimum loss for the
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bookmaker, instead of making a decision at the moment it is optimal to continue
learning. Themaximum loss happens at the point 12 because under this circumstance
the bookmaker is unable to distinguish which horse is treated as the winning horse
from the informed traders, the opening odds keep at 12 so that the loss to the
winning horse is one half no matter what information they possess. Note that this
figure contains the loss from both sides - whether the bookmaker determines to
change the price of horse A or horse B. It comes as no surprise that the figure is
symmetric because we assume for the bookmaker to achieve zero profits, the sum
of the prices of the two horses is equal to 1.
pB is decreasing and pA is increasing in the proportion of insiders (conditional on
θ = 1), µ, provided that pB < 1/2< pA. The comparative statics for the parameter
µ are described in Figure 5.3. Recall that the parameter µ denotes the fraction of
the informed traders in the learning process over a unit of time. It is easily seen
that pB is decreasing and pA is increasing in µ, the posterior bounds become wider
because the higher value of µ implies the learning process is more informative.
The non-monotonicity in the loss function can be explained from two perspectives.
On the one hand, a large proportion of insiders in the market would lead to a
huge loss to the bookmaker. On the other hand, since the bookmaker can get more
information per time period from the insiders, decisions will be taken sooner, which
means the loss declines. The base-case scenario explicitly shows that the maximum
loss occurs when the fraction µ = 16%.
pB is increasing and pA is decreasing in the volatility, σ, provided that pB <
1/2< pA. The comparative statics for the parameter σ are depicted in Figure 5.4.
As pB is increasing and pA is decreasing, the posterior bounds narrow to the point
0.5 which implies a decision is reached earlier. This is partially different from the
standard literature on real options where more uncertainty widens the decision
bounds. In this paper, more uncertainty lowers the bounds, but increases the loss.
Since this volatility part also represents the fraction of noise traders in the market,
the larger the value of σ, the more the noise traders and the less the informed
traders. As more uninformed traders make the learning process less informative
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and the signal is more noising, the loss is incurred in order to learn, but the costs
are the same, so we expect the decision is taken sooner, thereby lowering the loss
accordingly.
pB is decreasing and pA is increasing in the jump process, λ. The comparative
statics for the parameter λ are described in Figure 5.5. As pB is decreasing and
pA is increasing, the posterior bounds widen which implies the learning process
becomes more informative. A higher λ reduces the expected cost of keeping the
current odds and makes waiting longer more attractive, but the higher λ which
acts as a discount factor, the less we care about the future, the faster a decision is
reached. These are two opposing effects, one of which apparently dominates. In
our setting, the presence of a running loss is important. So the loss is decreasing
and the expected time to decision is increasing as in expectation it will take longer
to reach if the bounds widen.
We can also derive the expected time to decision. The procedure is standard,
which follows Poor and Hadjiliadis (2009). Combining theorems 4.13, 4.15 and
4.17, we obtain16
Ep[τ∗] = (1− p)E0[τ∗] + pE1[τ∗]
=
2σ2
(2µ)2
· log
[(
p
1− p
)1−2p(1− pB
pB
)1−2pB]
+
2σ2
(2µ)2
· p− pB
pA − pB · log
[(
pB
1− pB
)1−2pB(1− pA
pA
)1−2pA]
16See Appendix E for proof.
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Figure 5.3 Comparative Statics for µ
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Figure 5.4 Comparative Statics for σ
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Figure 5.5 Comparative Statics for λ
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5.6 Conclusions
The Bayesianmodel presented in this paper focuses on the optimal stopping problem
for the bookmaker who makes a decision on when to change the odds for each horse
in a race, given that there are informed traders in the market and the information
on which horse the informed traders prefer is unknown ex ante. The bookmaker
goes through this so-called learning process to assess whether (s)he has gathered
enough statistical evidence to determine the favourite horse among insiders at each
point in time by applying sequential hypothesis test.
In this 2-horse benchmark model, we have provided analytical results that can
give posterior bounds for adjusting the price of horse A or the price of horse B when
the learning stops. Once a decision is taken, no matter what it is, it is guaranteed
that the loss to the bookmaker is minimised.
We have also investigated the sensitivity of the model’s parameters to the
proposed solution to (5.8), which is consistent with our intuition. We find that (i)
as the fraction of the informed traders becomes larger, the posterior bounds get
wider and the bookmaker gets more information per time period along with the
non-monotonicity loss. One explanation is that the more informed traders, there is
more information the bookmaker can get per time period, which leads to a decision
being taken sooner. So the decreased loss should be expected, which is consistent
with our assumption as well as our intuition about this market. (ii) the decision
bounds narrow in the volatility term, as in noise traders in this model. A higher
volatility means less information, which leads to a decision is taken sooner; (iii) the
posterior bounds widen in the jump process, the bigger the value of λ the wider
the decision bounds, the lower the loss.
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5.7 Appendices
Appendix A. Loss of the Type II error
Similarly, let P∗B denote the adjusted price for horse B at time t given the event
{θ =−1}. The valuation of the uninformed trader, V, is also uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, 1]. For the informed trader, the bookmaker loses µ(P∗B − 1). For
the uninformed trader, he buys a horse-2 ticket if and only if his own valuation is
higher than P∗B . With probability 1− P∗B , an uninformed trader buys horse B and
the bookmaker loses P∗B − 1 on this kind. With probability P∗B , a horse-A ticket is
bought and the loss of this kind is 0. So the expected profit of a trade is
E(pro f it) = µ(P∗B − 1) + (1− µ)[(1− P∗B)(P∗B − 1) + P∗2 (1− P∗B − 0)]
Setting the above equation equal to 0, we can get
P∗B =
1
2(1− µ)
So the loss to the Type II error follows the same analysis.
EB(loss) = µ(1− P∗B − 1) + (1− µ)[(1− P∗B)(P∗B − 0) + P∗B(1− P∗B − 1)]
= −µP∗B + (1− µ)P∗B(1− 2P∗B)
= − µ
2(1− µ) +
1− µ
2(1− µ) [1−
2
2(1− µ) ]
= − µ
(1− µ)
where 0≤ µ < 12 .
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Appendix B. Proof of Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16)
Applying Ito’s lemma to equation (5.12) yields
dϕt =
2µ2
σ2
ϕtdSt +
1
2
(
2µ
σ2
)2ϕt(dSt)2
=
2µ2
σ2
ϕtdSt +
1
2
(
2µ
σ2
)2ϕtσ
2dt
=
2µ
σ2
ϕt(dSt + µdt)
Similarly applying Ito’s lemma to equation (5.14) yields
dpt = − π(π − 1)
(πϕt − π + 1)2 dϕt +
1
2
2π2(π − 1)
(πϕt − π + 1)3 dϕ
2
t
= − π(π − 1)
(πϕt − π + 1)2
2µ
σ2
ϕt(dSt + µdt)
+
1
2
2π2(π − 1)
(πϕt − π + 1)3 (
2µ
σ2
ϕt(dSt + µdt))2
=
2µ
σ2
(
πϕt
πϕt − π + 1)(
1− π
πϕt − π + 1)(dSt + µdt)
−(2µ
σ2
)2σ2(
πϕt
πϕt − π + 1)
2(
1− π
πϕt − π + 1)dt
=
2µ
σ2
pt(1− pt)dSt + 2µ
2
σ2
pt(1− pt)(1− 2pt)dt
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 1
For pL ≤ p¯, we define a mapping in the p 7→ L˘(p; pL) by
L˘(p; pL) = Aˆ(pL)ψˆ(p) + A˘(pL)ψ˘(p) (5.29)
where the constants Aˆ(pL) and A˘(pL) are given by
Aˆ(pL) =
ψ˘(pL)
2γ
[
G′0(pL)−
1/2− γ− pL
pL(1− pL) G0(pL)
]
(5.30)
and
A˘(pL) =
ψˆ(pL)
2γ
[
1/2+ γ− pL
pL(1− pL) G0(pL)− G
′
0(pL)
]
. (5.31)
Notice that LL˘(p; pL) − λL˘(p; pL) = 0 for all p ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, we
show that L˘(pL; pL) = G0(pL) and L˘′(pL; pL) = G′0(pL) > 0. With condition
2, it is ensured that G0( p¯) < 0 and since G′0(p) =
µ
1−µ > 0, it implies G0(·) is
monotonically increasing. With pL ∈ (0, p¯), it follows G0(pL) < 0 and
∂Aˆ(pL)
∂pL
= − ψ˘(pL)
2γ
· γ
2 − 14
p2L(1− pL)2
· G0(pL) > 0
and
∂A˘(pL)
∂pL
=
ψˆ(pL)
2γ
· γ
2 − 14
p2L(1− pL)2
· G0(pL) < 0
Therefore, it is easily verified that A˘(pL)< 0 for all pL. Since A˘(pL) is decreas-
ing in pL, and A˘(·) is strictly monotone between 0 and p¯, it is seen that A˘( p¯) < 0.
Condition 2 also ensures that Aˆ( p¯) < 0. Since Aˆ(·) is monotonically increasing
on (0, p¯), Aˆ(pL) < 0. Thus, the function p 7→ L˘(p; p¯) is concave on (0,1)17 and it
satisfies L˘(0+; p¯) = L˘(1−; p¯) = −∞.
17 L˘′′(p; p¯) = Aˆ( p¯)ψˆ′′(p) + A˘( p¯)ψ˘′′(p) < 0.
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Since Aˆ(pL) increases and A˘(pL) decreases in pL, it holds that
∂L˘(p;pL)
∂pL
=
∂Aˆ(pL)
∂pL
ψˆ(p) + ∂A˘(pL)∂pL ψ˘(p) > 0 for all p > pL
18.
So there is a unique point pH ∈ ( p¯,1) such that L˘′(pH; pL) = G′1(pH), ensuring
that L˘(pH; pL) increases in pL, but decreases in pH . Then we get the existence of
a unique point pB ∈ (0, p¯) for which there is pA ∈ ( p¯,1) such that L˘(pA; pB) =
G1(pA) and L˘′(pA; pB) = G′1(pA).
Figure 5.6 The Loss Function for Different Values of pL
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For pH ≥ p¯, we can also define the mapping in the p→ Lˆ(p; pH) by
Lˆ(p; pH) = Bˆ(pH)ψˆ(p) + B˘(pH)ψ˘(p) (5.32)
18For every p > pL, ψˆ(p) > ψˆ(pL) and ψ˘(p) < ψ˘(pL), then
∂Aˆ(pL)
∂pL
ψˆ(p) > ∂Aˆ(pL)∂pL ψˆ(pL) and
∂A˘(pL)
∂pL
ψ˘(p) > ∂A˘(pL)∂pL ψ˘(pL), therefore
∂L˘(p;pL)
∂pL
= ∂Aˆ(pL)∂pL ψˆ(p) +
∂A˘(pL)
∂pL
ψ˘(p) > ∂Aˆ(pL)∂pL ψˆ(pL) +
∂A˘(pL)
∂pL
ψ˘(pL) = 0.
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where the constants Bˆ(pH) and B˘(pH) are given by
Bˆ(pH) =
ψ˘(pH)
2γ
[G′1(pH)−
1/2− γ− pH
pH(1− pH) G1(pH)] (5.33)
and
B˘(pH) =
ψˆ(pH)
2γ
[
1/2+ γ− pH
pH(1− pH) G1(pH)− G
′
1(pH)]. (5.34)
Figure 5.7 The Loss Function for Different Values of pH
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It is easily verified that Lˆ(pH; pH) =G1(pH) and Lˆ′(pH; pH) =G′1(pH). Using
a similar method it holds that Bˆ < 0, B˘ < 0, and Lˆ is concave on (0,1).
So, in order to find the unique solution (pB, pA) to the optimal stopping problem
(5.9), the following conditions need to be satisfied

Lˆ(pB; pA) = G0(pB)
L˘(pA; pB) = G1(pA)
Lˆ′(pB; pA) = G′0(pB)
L˘′(pA; pB) = G′1(pA)
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Appendix D. Expected Discount Factors
Recall from equation (5.24) that the general solution to the second order stochastic
differential equation Lψ− λψ = 0 is
ψ(p) = Aˆψˆ(p) + A˘ψ˘(p) (5.35)
We need that ψ(pB) = 0 and ψ(pA) = 0, so
Aˆψˆ(pB) + A˘ψ˘(pB) = 0 (5.36)
which means
Aˆ = − ψ˘(pB)
ψˆ(pB)
A˘ (5.37)
Substituting (5.37) into (5.36), we obtain
ψ(p) = − ψ˘(pB)
ψˆ(pB)
A˘ψˆ(p) + A˘ψ˘(p) (5.38)
Therefore the discount factor is
vˆpB,pA(p) =
ψ(p)
ψ˘(pA)
=
− ψ˘(pB)
ψˆ(pB)
A˘ψˆ(p) + A˘ψ˘(p)
− ψ˘(pB)
ψˆ(pB)
A˘ψˆ(pA) + A˘ψ˘(pA)
=
−ψ˘(pB)ψˆ(p) + ψˆ(pB)ψ˘(p)
−ψ˘(pB)ψˆ(pA) + ψˆ(pB)ψ˘(pA)
=
√
p(1− p)
pA(1− pA)
(1−pBpB
p
1−p )
γ − ( pB1−pB
1−p
p )
γ
(1−pBpB
pA
1−pA )
γ − ( pB1−pB
1−pA
pA
)γ
(5.39)
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Appendix E. Expected Time to Decision
Theorem 5.7.1. (See Poor and Hadjiliadis (2009)) Consider the hypothesis pair
H0 : Zt = σWt + µ0t, t ≥ 0
versus
H1 : Zt = σWt + µ1t, t ≥ 0 (5.40)
and suppose (T,δ) is a sequential decision rule with error probabilities
P0(δT = 1) = α and P1(δT = 0) = γ, (5.41)
where α,γ ∈ (0,1). Then
E0{T} ≥ − 2σ
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
[
α log
(
1− γ
α
)
+ (1− α) log
(
γ
1− α
)]
(5.42)
and
E1{T} ≥ − 2σ
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
[
(1− γ) log
(
1− γ
α
)
+ γ log
(
γ
1− α
)]
(5.43)
with equality if (T,δ) is the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT).
Theorem 5.7.2. (See Poor and Hadjiliadis (2009)) Consider the hypotheses (5.40), and
denote by (T,δ) the SPRT(A, B) with 0< A ≤ 1≤ B <∞, and A < B. Then
P0(δT = 1) =
1− A
B− A (5.44)
and
P1(δT = 0) = A
B− 1
B− A (5.45)
where
A =
1− π
π
πL
1− πL (5.46)
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and
B =
1− π
π
πH
1− πH (5.47)
Combining 5.7.1 and 5.7.2, we obtain
α = P0(δT = 1) =
1− A
B− A
=
(π − πL)(1− πH)
(1− π)(πH − πL) (5.48)
and
γ = P1(δT = 0) = A
B− 1
B− A
=
πL(πH − π)
π(πH − πL) (5.49)
So
Eπ(T) = π · E1(T) + (1− π) · E0(T)
=
2σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 · log
[(
π
1− π
)1−2π(1− πL
πL
)1−2πL]
+
2σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 ·
π − πL
πH − πL · log
[(
πL
1− πL
)1−2πL(1− πH
πH
)1−2πH]
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
6.1 Conclusions
In order to summarise this thesis, we present the main research questions of each
chapter in turn and show what the limitations are and how these issues can be
extended for future research.
This thesis is a collection of empirical and theoretical studies on the horserace
betting markets, which contributes to the literature by answering the following
questions: (i) Do insider trading problems exist in the horseracing betting markets?
If so, can we find out the degree of the insider trading? (ii) Are the racing betting
markets efficient? (iii) What kind of determinants will affect the starting prices?
Are these factors persistent? (iv) How do bookmakers adjust the betting odds for
each horse in a race?
To provide answers to the first two questions that we aim to investigate, we
present the empirical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 by applying large novel data sets,
which collected respectively from the Yorkshire on-course racing markets in 2013
and 2014, to the Shin measure (1993) as well as the extension of the Shin (Jullien and
Salanié (1994)). As is highlighted by the theoretical results of Shin (1993), the way
to infer the incidence of insider trading in the British betting markets is similar to
the bid-ask spread (hinted at by Bagehot (1971), developed by Copeland and Galai
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(1983), and further analysed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985)) quoted
by market makers in financial markets. His empirical investigation concludes that
insider trading problem do exist in betting markets and the degree of insider trading
is around 2% when the weekly data are utilised. He also shows a strong positive
relationship between the sum of prices and the number of competitors in the race.
Our empirical results in Chapter 2 demonstrate that the incidence of insider
trading is around 1.7%, based on the nine Yorkshire racecourses data in the 2013
race season. The correlation between the total prices and the number of runners
is also positive, which can be verified in the study. Besides that, we attempt to
compute the degree of insider trading at opening and starting prices respectively
for each racetrack based on the extension of the Shin model that allows doing the
calculation at the individual level. We find that the weighted average degree at the
starting prices is 2.103%, which is slightly higher than the value that we compute
under the original Shin. We also report that the weighted average degree of insider
trading at the opening prices is 1.64%. We find no evidence to confirm that the
market is strongly efficient.
Chapter 3 comes as an extension of Chapter 2, which is used to consolidate
our results by employing a different data set. The data set is also collected nine
racecourses in Yorkshire, but the racing season that we focus on in this chapter was
in 2014. The estimation results demonstrate that the weighted average degree of
insider trading at the starting prices is around 2.068%, while at the opening prices
1.65%. The results in both chapters are pretty much the same. We also extend our
analysis to other issues in this chapter. In particular, we provide empirical evidence
that a gambler is doomed to lose even if he constantly herds with the favourite
horse, and in our sample set, the winning starting prices equal the favourite starting
prices in 390 races, which implies in these races the winning horse is actually the
favourite horse. For the rest 780 races, the winning horse is not the favourite horse.
On average the loss to the favourite horse is approximately 0.3314. Our finding
shows that there is supportive evidence that informed punters tend to bet early
with on-course bookmakers, which is consistent with the Crafts’ empirical findings
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(1985). Regarding the market efficiency test, we demonstrate that Yorkshire on-
course betting markets are not strongly efficient. We also show that the average
rate of return at both starting and opening prices is significantly negatively affected
by the incidence of insider trading.
We aim to answer question (ii) in Chapter 4. In our setup, a unique cross-
sectional and time series data set is employed to find out the determinants that
might affect starting prices in horserace betting markets. In order to fully appreciate
our empirical results, we perform three tests, that is, Hausman test, Pesaran’s cross-
sectional dependence test and time-fixed effects tests. Winning potential is a very
important variable in this chapter, which is defined as oneminus the horse’s position
over total runners in the race. Our findings show that the winning potential is
significant in explaining the price of the horse. Besides this factor, the age of the
horse, the weight the horse carries and the distance of the racecourse are quite
important as well. Other factors like the condition of the turf, the size of the
racetrack and the classification of the race also have influences on the starting
prices. All the estimation results confirm that these determinants are persistent.
The last question is presented in Chapter 5. To do so, we firstly develop a
general equilibrium framework, then in order to make the general model tractable
and obtain rich analytical results, we analyse a two-horse benchmark model by
introducing optimal stopping theory into the betting literature. We are interested
in how bookmakers adjust the betting odds. By taking informed and uninformed
punters into consideration, a risk neutral bookmaker who decides an optimal time
to change the price for each horse in a race given that the cumulative sales of tickets
on horse A, net of the cumulative sales of tickets on horse B are modelled by an
arithmetic Brownian motion. Analytical solutions provide a complete understand-
ing of the model in this study. Our findings highlight the following properties. As
the fraction of informed traders gets bigger, the posterior bounds become wider
and the bookmaker could receive more information per time period. This gives us
the non-monotonicity loss happens because of two opposing effects. On the one
hand, a large proportion of insiders causes a huge loss to the bookmaker, which
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explains why the loss is increasing at the initial stage. On the other hand, more
informed traders imply that there is more information the bookmaker can get per
time period, which leads to a decision being taken sooner. This explains why the
loss is declining after reaching a maximum point µ = 16%. As σ goes up, there
are more noise traders in the market. So the signal that the bookmaker observed
is more noising. The loss is incurred to learn, but the process is not informative
and the costs are the same. We, therefore, expect a decision is reached earlier.
The decision bounds get widening as the intensity λ becomes larger. The loss is
declining because of the same reason that we have identified for µ.
6.2 Future Research
Besides the questions we first set out to investigate, this thesis has raised additional
problems for future research. In Chapters 2 and 3 we applied the new data sets to
the Shin model, we contributed to the literature by confirming the results presented
by Shin and other researchers who also followed the Shin measure. Another
contribution is how we deal with data in MatLab as the data we utilised is publicly
available and short lived. Although we agree that Shin did capture the insider
trading problem in British horseracing betting markets, his model is restricted
by lots of assumptions. It would be worthwhile to re-modify and see whether a
more general model can be established. Furthermore, due to the constraints on
the on-course betting markets that transactions are made in cash, we are looking
forward to some improvements if online betting markets are included in the future
study. Is it difficult or easy to detect the degree of insider trading when punters
prefer to bet online with a large amount of money? What do betting companies
react to such behaviour? Does prize money have anything to do with the insider
trading?
In Chapter 4 we found out the factors that influence the starting prices. As we
mentioned earlier, jockey’s characteristics had not been included in the empirical
analysis due to the lack of data. Other factors like weather or a bombshell could
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also affect the odds. The empirical method applies ordinary least squares equations
to panel data. Do other models suit our research purpose? These will improve the
accuracy of our empirical model which provide an agenda for future research.
All of these questions lead to our final problem. That is, how do bookmakers
adjust the odds of the horses during the betting period? Analytical results only
provide a basic understanding of a two-horse benchmark model in this thesis. Can
we extend this model? Can we obtain rich results from our general equilibrium
framework? Both questions are equivalently important and are challenging us in
the future.
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Betting Glossary
A glossary of used betting terms is as follows1.
Back
To bet or wager a horse is to back it.
Betting ring
The main area at a racecourse where the bookmakers operate.
Bookmaker
The person who takes your bet and pays you if you win.
Decimal odds
See odds.
Dutch book
To bet on a number of horses, at varying odds, such that whichever bet wins, a set
profit is guaranteed.
Evens
The fractional odds 1/1.
Favourite
The most popular horse in a race. It will have the shortest odds. There may be
more than one horses in a race. See Joint-favourites.
1Accessible via: http://www.racinguk.com/about-us/horseracing-betting-terms;
http://www.tophorseracinglinks.com/html/glossary.htm.
http://onlinebookmaker.com/betting-terms-glossary/list/2/d.
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Fixed-odds betting
The dividend is fixed at the odds when you placed you bet.
Fractional odds
See odds.
Joint-favourites
When a bookmaker cannot separate two/three horses for favouritism, they are
made joint favourites.
Long odds
For example 10/1 is longer than 2/1 - long odds are applied to competitors that the
bookmaker thinks are less likely to win.
Long-shot
A long-shot horse in a race is the one that has long odds and is therefore deemed
to have little chance to win the race.
Mutuel pool
Short for ‘parimutuel pool’. Sum of the bets on a race or event, such as the win
pool, daily double pool, exacta pool, etc.
Odds
The bookmakers’ view of the chance of a competitor winning (adjusted to include a
profit). The figure or fraction by which a bookmaker or totalisator offers to multiply
a bettor’s stake, which the bettor is entitled to receive (plus his or her own stake) if
the horse that (s)he selects wins. Odds can be expressed as a fraction, for example,
5/1 or 5/2. Odds can also be expressed as a decimal - so 5/1 would be 5.0, and 5/2
would be 2.5.
Oddsmaker
Similar to bookmaker. A person who sets the betting odds.
Off-course bookmaker
A bookmaker who is not present at the racecourse or other event, for example, in a
high street betting shop or online.
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On-course bookmaker
On the racecourse or at the event.
Opening odds
The first available odds at the racecourses.
Over-broke
A bookmaker makes a mistake by calculating the odds at an event that add up to
less than 100%.
Over-round
The opposite of the above. The bookmaker’s profit, which is determined by how
much over 100% the total odds add up to.
Payout
What you get back from the bookmaker - your winnings and returned stake.
Punt
Another term for bet or wager.
Punter
A person who places a bet.
Short odds
For example 2/1 is shorter than 4/1 - short odds are applied to competitors that the
bookmaker thinks are more likely to win.
Starting Price or SP
The price on a horse at the start of the race when the book closes.
Stake
The amount of money you bet.
Tote
The organisation appointed to receive bets and supply dividends in proportion to
the amount of money wagered.
Wager
Bet, lay or gamble.
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